


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Air War College

SOUTH KOREA AND ITS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

RESEARCH REPORT

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1. REPORT NUMBER MS116-81	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD A107586	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) South Korea and Its Security Environment		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Research Report,
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) 12 Col So Chin-Tae, Korean Air Force		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AWC/EDRM Maxwell AFB AL 36112		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Commandant Air War College Maxwell AFB AL 36112		12. REPORT DATE Apr 1981
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 120
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCL
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ONLY XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (Proprietary Information) </div> Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
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REPORT NO. MS116-81

SOUTH KOREA AND ITS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

(Korea's Position in the Power Relationship between the
United States, the Soviet Union, Japan & China)

by

So Chin-Tae, [REDACTED]
Colonel, Korean AF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 1981

Accession For	
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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY
NO. MS 116-81

TITLE: South Korea and Its Security Environment
(Korea's Position in the Power Relationship between
the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan & China)

AUTHOR: So Chin-Tae, Colonel, Republic of Korea Air Force

→ This report begins with an overview of Korea's geography and historical background to illustrate the major impact they imparted on the current cultural environment -- social, economic, and political -- in Korea. Since the foreign policies of the neighboring big powers (US, USSR, Japan and China) dictate the destiny of Korea, a review is made of their interests in the Korean peninsula. The study then proceeds to take a look at the security environment on the Korean peninsula in terms of the international situations which surround the peninsula and the military environment, with particular attention to the military posture of both Koreas and the US forces in Korea. Lastly, the author attempts to clarify Korea's position in the power relationship between those four big powers with focus on Korea's major tasks in the coming decade, stressing the effective maintenance of US-ROK security system and promotion of economic cooperation with US-ROK and ROK-Japan. 八

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel So Chin-Tae (BS, Korean Air Force Academy; MPS, Auburn University at Montgomery) entered F-86F flight training upon graduation from the Korean Air Force Academy in 1960. This was followed by additional F-5 training. He has visited America three times. He was assigned to Randolph AFB, Texas, in 1965 to attend Instrument Pilot Instructor School. He returned in 1969 for another flight training to David-Monthan AFB, Arizona, where he undertook F-4 conversion training. For the past two years, prior to selection to the Air War College, Colonel So has been commander of a F-5E fighter squadron. His most recent assignment before leaving Korea was Chief of War Study, Assistant Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis, Headquarters Republic of Korea Air Force. He is a graduate of the RAF Staff College, Bracknell in England (No. 64 Course in 1974), and the Air War College, class of 1981.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after World War II, democracy was accepted as the guiding principle for the emerging nations of the non-Communist world. Since then, however, democracy has been subject to the crushing burdens of political reality in each state that adopted it. It has clashed head on with authoritarian ideologies and practices, both old and new. In a world still divided partly on the basis of ideology, the orientation of the newly independent states towards, or away from, democracy is a significant question.

Until the Korean War, the world was hardly aware of the existence of the Korean peninsula, let alone the significance. Today, Korea is one of the few countries in the world where the United States is heavily involved. Not only does the United States have over 30,000 ground troops in Korea, excluding additional 9,000 U.S. Air Force personnel, but it is also responsible for operational control over the entire 600,000 strong Korean military forces as agent for the United Nations Command and as senior partner in the US-ROK Combined Forces Command. Since 1945 the United States has appropriated a total of \$6 billion to beef up the Korean economy in addition to the \$7 billion in U.S. military assistance.¹ This does not count the billions of dollars spent and the thousands of American lives lost in the Korean War. Korea is unique as a geopolitical meeting point for the neighboring four big powers -- the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China.

In particular, since the assassination of the late President Park in October 1979, there has been discussion among people concerning the uncertainties of the social, political, and economic systems in the Republic

of Korea. Many people showed serious concern about the direction of the future of Korea. I believe both confusion and distortion derive mainly from a lack of understanding. Surprisingly too little about Korea is known to Americans. Therefore, a candid and organized assessment of the situations in Korea and a frank presentation of Korea's position will be required. It is not simple at all to understand an isolated remote country by applying Western standards. We need to identify and comprehend the critical variables affecting Korea's position. I will seek to make these variables clear, and present their combined impact upon today's Korea for the sake of Americans who need a better understanding of the problems Korea faces.


In this paper, I will start with an overview of Korea's geography and historical background. Inevitably, the background had a major impact upon the current cultural environment, which I will discuss in Chapter III with regard to social, economic and political developments. As Korea is the victim of foreign policies of the neighboring big powers, Korean security can hardly be discussed without a review of what their interests in the Korean peninsula are (Chapter IV). Then I will proceed to take a look at the security environment on the Korean peninsula (Chapter V) in terms of the international situations surrounding the peninsula and the military environment with respect to military posture of both Koreas and U.S. forces in Korea. Lastly Korea's position in the power relationship between those four big powers will be discussed with focus on Korea's major tasks in the coming decade, stressing the effective maintenance of US-ROK security system and economic cooperation (Chapter VI). This chapter also deals with issues of refitting of ROK-Japan economic ties and Japanese contribution to the regional security.

My discussion throughout the paper will be developed primarily for an American audience. The opinions I express are strictly personal and are not based necessarily on formal academic analysis. They have emerged from my personal experience and observations acquired during my 21 years service in the Korean Air Force.

CHAPTER II


OVERVIEW OF KOREA'S GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

1. Geography: Korea is a peninsula thrusting 600 miles from Northeast Asia in a southerly direction to within one hundred and twenty miles of the Japanese islands. Its east coast faces the East Sea (Sea of Japan); its west coast the Yellow Sea. Most of its northern boundary is formed by the winding Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Seoul, the capital city of the Republic of Korea (ROK: South Korea), lies some 700 miles west of Tokyo, 300 miles southeast of Shenyang, and 800 miles northwest of Okinawa.



The area of the peninsula is 221,325 square kilometers (about 86,000 square miles), almost equal in size to the combined areas of Tennessee and Kentucky. At present it is divided into two parts, Communist north Korea and free south Korea. The latter's effective administrative area is about 45 percent of the peninsula -- about the same area as either Kentucky or Portugal.

The peninsula, contiguous to the continental powers of China and Russia and adjacent to oceanic Japan, acted for long as a land bridge through which continental culture was transmitted to Japan.



A peninsula location has both the advantage of easy access to adjacent cultures and the disadvantage of becoming the target of aggressive neighbors.

2. People and Settlements: In 1978, South Korea had a population of about 37 million and North Korea (as of 1976) was estimated to have about 16.5 million. Before World War II, Koreans migrated to Manchuria and Japan. It is estimated that about 600,000 Koreans remain in Japan. The most important migration in recent times is the north-to-south movement of the people after 1945 and during the Korean War (1950-1953). About 2,000,000 people have been known to migrate from the North to the South since 1945 when World War II ended and Russians occupied the northern part of the peninsula. Koreans are of one blood, mono-lingual (Korean), and there are no racial minorities.

Rapid economic growth and industrialization have accelerated urbanization in Korea. Increases in urban population in South Korea have brought about a decrease in the rural population. However, still a large proportion (48.7% according to the 1975 census) live in the countryside. The majority of the rural population is engaged in agriculture and its distribution is very closely associated with distribution of cultivated land.

The rate of concentration of population has been especially great in Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, and Pusan, the largest port city. The population of Seoul has increased during the last few decades reaching 7.8 million in 1978.

The urban landscape has also changed, especially since the late 1960s. Before 1960, no sky rocketing modern buildings existed in Seoul, but by the early 1970s dozens of buildings with more than thirty stories had begun to appear in the business district of Seoul. Consequently, streets have been widened and expressways and freeways built. Streetcars were removed in 1969, and a subway was completed in 1974 with additional subway systems under construction. Public services such as water, communications, and gas are being expanded but demand for them seems always one step ahead.

3. A Glance at Korean History: Korea possesses a rich and unique culture of its own with a long historical heritage and national tradition. The country is well-endowed with natural beauty and is called "the land of morning calm." But it is one of the most tragic nations of the world. Being small and weak, and situated at a strategic point -- at the confluence of U.S., Chinese, Russian, and Japanese interests -- it had been the victim of recurring invasions and counter-invasions by the neighboring states of China, Japan, and Russia, which are all stronger than itself. (Koreans have suffered from more than 900 external attacks throughout their history.) For centuries, Korea had been a bridge between China and Japan for the flow of culture and civilization from the former to the latter.

When the last quarter of the nineteenth century began, Korea was under the reign of the Yi dynasty, which ruled the country for more than five hundred years before it lost its independence to Japan in 1910. The centuries-old political, social, and ethical institutions of the Yi dynasty Korea, which were based upon the rigid and hierarchical doctrines of Confucianism, were in the process of decay and disintegration. The royal government was infested with factional strife and the corrupt practices of the nobility. The society was tradition-bound, static, and stratified into classes of nobility ("Yang-bahn") and commoners ("Sang-in"). While the aristocratic class of "Yang-bahn" enjoyed the fruits of wealth, power, and prestige, the common people were suppressed under poverty and ignorance. The economic structure of the society was basically agrarian with very little industry and commerce.

As for the political situation, the central government was weak and alienated from the people. Local loyalties were powerful and conditioned the attitude of the rural people toward the political center. The govern-

ment at Seoul was remote from them. The actual power of the government and administration was exercised by the cliques of the ruling classes who constantly fought with each other over the spoils of authority and position.

The king, although absolute sovereign of the state in theory, had no control over the policy and measures of the government in practice. In a nutshell, as elsewhere in the MIDDLE AGES, Korea was an aristocracy, with a hierachical and feudal society and tradition-bound people without any political or social consciousness. They were not aware of the changing faces of the modern world and of the new forces of imperialism, militarism, and economic-diplomacy generated by the modern culture of the West. A common cultural heritage and a common language coupled with a long and uninterrupted monarchic rule of a single dynasty, were the unifying factors of the Korean society.

Such were the sociopolitical conditions and environment prevailing in the Korean society and country when the powers of the outside world knocked at its gates, which were kept resolutely closed by the sleeping society and rulers of Korea. This attitude of seclusion was the natural outcome of the experience of repeated foreign invasions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Manchus, Mongols, and Japanese. The policy of isolation and the fending-off from the strange civilization of the West was stubbornly executed even after China and Japan had been opened by the West.

The location of Korea between two powerful neighbors (China and Japan) has created problems throughout its history. Except for one century of Mongol rule, the Koreans have managed to maintain their own cultural identity as a separate nation for almost two thousand years. But while Korea

has for the most part run its own affairs, it was nonetheless forced to pay tribute to China as the elder in the Confucian family of nations. Although Korea has no great militaristic tradition, it was at times the battle field for the wars of others. The Koreans came out of these experiences with the tough resilience for which they have always been noted.

For many centuries, Koreans have shown remarkable artistic and technical creativity. One of the world's first uses of movable metal type was in Korea. The alphabet, "Han-gul", is today still considered one of the most accurate and practical of all writing systems. In the sixteenth century a Korean admiral invented the world's first iron-clad ship ("turtle ship") to help turn back the Japanese invasion. In the arts, Korea traditionally has excelled in ceramics, painting, woodwork, textiles, and architecture. In the present day, some of the most accomplished pianists, violinists, and singers are coming from Korea.

In politics, factionalism has been a permanent plague. Factionalism was a major cause of corruption and stagnation during the Yi Dynasty, whose collapse led to Japanese condominium. As a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan replaced China's long-time influence in Korea, and in 1910 formally annexed Korea. Over the years, the Japanese tried to stamp out everything Korean, and turn the people into second-class Japanese. The one national characteristic of the Koreans that the Japanese made use of was industriousness. Japanese landowners and businessmen took full advantage of Korean labor to provide the Japanese Empire with food, raw materials, and basic industries.

Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945 was a tarnished triumph. The country was divided in half between a Communist north and a non-Communist south. Korea became once again a pawn of big powers, this time the Soviet

Union (north) and the United States (south). This arbitrary division of the country resulted in enormous social, economic and political problems. Further complications set in with the war between North and South Korea. No stranger to misfortune, the Korean people suffered as never before during the Korean War. After the war American aid came in generous amounts and was very beneficial, but due to the devastation of the country and a lack of political leadership, it took a long time for the wounds of war to heal.

When crises beset the young Republic, the Koreans resorted to those measures with which they were the most familiar. They granted extraordinary powers to Dr. Syngman Rhee, who was the first President of the Republic, and a strong, articulate Princeton-educated political leader. During the years which followed independence (15 August 1948), there was a constant struggle between President Rhee and the legislature for dominance. Dr. Rhee attempted to strengthen the presidency by removal of the constitutional barrier to a third four-year term in office. As his power increased and corruption in government became more widespread, dissatisfaction with the government grew. The rigged elections of 15 March 1960 caused this anger and frustration to erupt in what is now referred to as the "April 19 Student Uprising." As a result of this revolution, a new republic was formed and the constitution was amended and the presidential system was replaced by the cabinet system. For a brief period following Rhee's downfall, the flower of democracy seemingly bloomed only to fail in its full blossom. Ultimately, the Second Republic (19 April 1960 - 16 May 1961) proved ineffective in dealing with the many justifiable grievances of the people. The short year of its administration was marked by the continuing spread of corruption, nepotism, high unemployment, cons-


tant demonstrations, and the irresponsible abuses of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people. The student uprisings had obviously convinced the people that the way to get action was to take to the streets virtually without regard to cause. The various political factions of the Administration continued bickering amongst themselves while the political and economic problems of the nation grew steadily worse.

On 16 May 1961, a junta of military officers seized governmental power through a coup and immediately suspended the constitution. When civilian rule was restored, a new constitution came into effect, favoring the presidential system. Although General Park Chung Hee came to power as a result of the coup, he was later elected to the presidency in presidential elections of 1963 and 1967, which were noted for their fairness. As the constitution existed in 1969, President Park would not have been permitted to run for a third term. However, the government managed to pass an amendment to the constitution, which enabled him to run for another term of office. In 1971, he was elected for a new term which would expire in 1975. At the time of the election in 1971, there was discussions among intellectuals and in the media in which the general belief was expressed that the appropriateness of adopting a totally Western style democracy by the Republic should be critically reexamined. They advocated that South Korea should develop some new form of democracy that would be compatible with its traditions, culture, and contemporary needs.

In October 1972, President Park declared martial law, proclaimed a special declaration, suspended certain articles of the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, banned political party activities and the right to assembly. All of this, he claimed, was necessary for the peaceful reunification of the country and to initiate a series of "revitalizing re-

forms," so-called "Yu-Shin" (維新) -- to include, once again, changes in the constitution. Shortly thereafter, while the Republic was still under martial law, a national referendum was held and the new draft constitution, with its revitalizing reforms, was adopted. Immediately following on the heels of the referendum, the electoral college, called as the National Conference for Unification ("Tong-Il Ju-Chae Kook-Min Hoe-ui" 統一主体国民会议) which was made up of members completely loyal to President Park, reelected him to a third term for six years.

The accomplishments of the Park Administration are well known. A genuine national effort was organized to insure political stability, economic development, and national security for the first time in the recent history of Korea, although President Park failed to prevent the new constitution from establishing the presidency above the checks and balances between the executive, the legislative and judicial branches that are normally found in a Western democracy.



The Gyeongbokgung Palace was fire-burned in 1592 and restored in later years.

4. Partition of the Korean Peninsula: The first reference to the future of Korea by the Allies during World War II was made at Cairo Conference in November 1943. The American, British and Chinese governments issued a declaration stating:¹

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

At Yalta, in February 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt had a private conversation with Joseph Stalin, and during the talk Roosevelt suggested the idea of a Korean trusteeship to be administered by the United States, China, and Russia. Significant was the agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin that, once the Japanese surrender had been accepted and the trusteeship set up, Soviet and U.S. troops would withdraw from Korea. At this time the surrender of Japanese troops in northern Korea was to be accepted by the armies of China, while the Japanese surrender in Korea of the south was to be accepted by the armies of the United States. At the time it seemed that the most effective way to accept a Japanese surrender in Korea was for the Chinese troops to move overland into northern Korea, while the United States would move its troops by ship into southern Korea. But the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on the 6th of August 1945 gave Russia the opportunity to cut through Manchuria like "a knife in soft butter." This changed everything. Not only was it now impossible from where they stood to receive the Japanese surrender in Korea, there were even doubts as to whether American forces could be brought there in time. Thus, on the night of 10th of August 1945, the American government agreed to carry on with a modified version of earlier plans. It was decided that the Russians would be allowed to accept the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel (since they were already crossing the Yalu River), and that United

States forces would accept it below as soon as they could brought in.

Unfortunately, with the end of World War II, the national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union clashed, and the result was that liberation from the Japanese occupation was not followed by the independence and unification that had been pledged. Instead, there was a permanent division of the peninsula into two conflicting camps. America and Russia arbitrarily divided the Korean peninsula by the 38th parallel, simply for their own convenience in disarming the surrendered Japanese armed troops.

Being intent on spreading her influence throughout the Far East, the Soviet Union fed her ideology into north Korea, while American democracy and assistance held sway in the south. Thus, Korea, one nation with a single people, a single language and a single culture, but too long under the dominance of Japan and the interference of neighboring big powers, has no time to find for herself true identity under one flag.

CHAPTER III

CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTS OF SOUTH KOREA

1. Economic Development: Any discussion of cultural environment must be concerned with the economic picture. In analyzing the economics of a developing country such as South Korea, let us first consider the phenomenal development of the Korean economy. A recent World Bank report described the situation in these words:¹

From a position uncomfortably close to the bottom of the international income scale and without the aid of any significant natural resources, Korea embarked on a course of industrial growth that became one of the outstanding success stories in international development.

Since the launching of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962, the Korean economy has maintained an annual average GNP growth rate of ten percent.² This rapid growth is attributed to the structural transformation from subsistence agriculture to modern manufacturing. Given the limited size of the domestic market, we found it necessary to adopt the strategy of export-oriented industrialization. Foreign capital in Korea played the dual function of financing import requirements for the rapid industrialization and of supplementing the scarce domestic capital available for investment. After 15 years of rapid development, the Korean economy has improved substantially in its degree of self-reliance in capital formation and balance of payments.

The achievement of Korea's current domestic and international status and the economic miracle that made the status possible is all the more remarkable when one realizes that South Korea was in the space of only thirty years left the age of feudalism and isolation. It has embarked upon and

has successfully weathered the severest moments of its own industrial revolution. It has overcome its former status as a mendicant of other Free World governments, particularly the United States; and, finally, it has taken its place as a major economic power in its own geographical region. In addition, it has gained international recognition for its domestic stability, industriousness, productivity, and for directly assisting an Asian ally in the Vietnam conflict against Communism.³

How were these achievements made possible? What has been the cost to South Korean society for these achievements? That the South Korean miracle could have also been produced by another form of government certainly cannot be disputed. However, whether another form of government could have done so in the same period of time and while being subjected to the same stresses can be argued. Although such a debate would be highly effective from the standpoint of achieving the announced goals of each of its Five-Year Economic Development Plans (FEDEPs). The student uprising in April 1960 and the military coup in May 1961 were in large measure brought about because of the desperate condition of the South Korean economy. Those two events were expressions of the most profound nature by the people of their demands for a government that would enable them to lead a better daily existence -- constant poverty and inept government had become unendurable. The leaders of the coup took power with the firm belief that, under the then existing circumstances, food had to come before politics. The priority was to construct, as quickly as possible, a self-reliant economy, at some social self-sacrifice if necessary. Only with a full stomach, we believed, could one enjoy the arts and relaxed discussions of social development.

a. Economic Development Plans: In 1960 consumer spending was 98.6

percent of GNP while export earnings accounted for only 6.3 percent of GNP. With the U.N. declaration of the Decade of Development, Korea had to form a comprehensive development plan to get assistance and cooperation from international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank.

When the First FEDEP began in 1962, the investment requirements were met mostly with foreign funds. To attract foreign investment, the Foreign Capital Inducement Law was enacted in 1962 and the normalization pact with Japan in 1965. The aim of the First FEDEP was import substitution in consumer goods which in the 1960s was supported by grants-in-aid from the United States. (See chart, p. 12) During the period of 1962-66, the average annual growth in GNP was 10.3 percent.

The Second FEDEP began in 1967 with a transition to export-oriented growth strategy. As Korea is endowed with few natural resources, export of industrial products could be possible only through the import of raw materials. What we learn is processing and manufacturing exports dependency of the national economy increased from 10.7 percent during the First FEDEP period to 26.3 percent during the Second FEDEP period. The average export of \$137,200,000 for the First FEDEP period rose to \$29,500,000 during the Second FEDEP (1967-71) -- about five-fold increase. The average annual GNP growth during the Second FEDEP period was 11.3 percent. Characteristic aspects worthy of note during this period were improvement in agricultural productivity through modernizing agriculture and the higher farming household income which accrued from the government's policy of paying high grain prices.

To meet the investment requirement and domestic savings, the government had to diversify domestic financial institutions while allowing foreign banks to open branch offices in Korea. To help develop the Korea Exchange

U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants-Obligations and Loan Authorizations

COUNTRY: KOREA, REPUBLIC OF		U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS									
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Bank was unaugurated, in July 1976 the Housing Bank came into being, and in December 1968 Korea Trust Bank was opened. On the other hand, the government encouraged corporations to go public, thus enhancing public savings through the Stock Exchange.

The Third FEDEP (1972-76) was designed to stimulate growth with economic stability and balance, to encourage the construction of a self-supporting economic structure, and to promote balanced development among various regions. The third plan emphasized "innovative" development of the rural economy, and the construction of heavy and chemical industries. During this period the growth of Korean economy peaked at an all-time high of 16.7 percent in 1973, averaging 11.2 percent for the period.

The Fourth FEDEP (1977-81) encountered a severe problem due to the second oil crisis in 1978 and the assassination of President Park in 1979. Events occurring during this crisis period in world economy were reflected in a change of the Korean economic growth pattern. Korea's GNP during the second quarter of 1980 plunged by 5.9 percent over the year before to bring the combined growth in the GNP to a negative 1.8 percent. The economic downturn, which started around the beginning of the second half of 1979, coupled with the wobbly situation on the political and social front created by President Park's death. In addition, unfavorable overseas factors such as the oil crunch were cited as major contributing factors to depress further the total output of the nation. But it is considered fortunate that the Koreans could successfully curb their economic downturn at the negative growth rate of five percent.⁵

b. Korea Economy in 1981: The Korean economy has entered into a recovery stage beginning late last year after suffering through the worst slump since the country began its industrial boom in the late 1960s.

Shin Byong Hyung, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning Board, was quoted by the Washington Post as saying that he expected a five to six percent growth in gross national product in 1981, and that by 1982, the growth rate should be eight or nine percent, almost equal to the momentum piled up in the miracle years of the 1970s.⁶ The daily further noted that because Korea's economy is export-oriented, these high expectations depend to a large extent on the industrial world's performance, and another "dose of political stability such as that which prevailed throughout much of the previous decade." The paper maintained:⁷

But some key signs have turned in a more favorable direction. Letters of credit, the most reliable indicator of what's to come in the export field, were up 39 percent, that heralds a busy time in the first half of 1981.

Inflation for 1982 will be contained around the level of ten percent, although the single digit rate will be hard to realize in the immediate future.⁸ Warehouse inventories are decreasing substantially and industrial production is rapidly increasing. The flood of overseas orders for ships indicates the strength of this prediction. In January 1981 alone, according to statistics compiled by the Korea Shipbuilders Association, four shipbuilders secured a total of \$266 million worth of shipbuilding contracts for ten vessels -- 13.6 percent of the year's shipbuilding export goal (\$2,000 million).⁹

c. Future Prospects: Will Korea be able to overcome the economic difficulties? The manner in which Korea handles the challenges of the next five years, in particular of this year, will predict the answer to this question. The challenges are fourfold and serious. While there is controversy about whether too much emphasis was placed on exports during 1970s, no one denies the essential importance of exports to the dream of Korea as a fully developed industrial power. Even though it is appropriate

for Korea to run a continuing balance of trade deficit during the present development period, the bulk of these required imports must still be paid for with current export receipts.

When industrialization began, the productivity gains were startling. But as the base of productively employed labor expanded, gains were harder to achieve. Still, the 1970s saw 11 percent annual increases in manufacturing productivity and three percent in the large agricultural sector. But problems were brewing. Investment into the heavy machinery and chemical industries has not found the rewards of light industry investment experience. With low capacity utilization, unit costs soar and products can not be profitably sold at world market prices. The challenge, then, is to utilize Korea's modern plants sufficiently to allow those firms with large overhead expenses to survive. A corollary of this is the issue of wages. Few, if any, countries can match Korea for the industriousness and the maximum productivity of laborers; competitiveness in international markets is dependent on the price of the human labor component. It is for this reason that Korea's three largest export industries -- textiles, garments and electronics -- are subject to a severe test from their counterparts, in Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore and other rapidly developing nations. World markets offer no protection to the competitors for limited export sales; price and quality are what matter.

The second challenge is Korea's ability to satisfy the legitimate material needs of the labor force without compromising the laborer's fair wage (without causing inflation) and productivity. The third challenge lies in the uncontrollable foreign variables which have a large domestic impact. World inflation increases the price of imports generally. Inflation must come down before a strong, sound business upturn can be sustained. The

controlled increases in oil prices especially exacerbate the balance of trade problems of our resource-poor country. The final set of challenges for Korea in the 1980s lies in its various political spheres. At the local (Korean peninsula), regional and global levels, skillful handling of political issues is required to convert problems into opportunities.

Perhaps the most difficult challenges will be the political ones, and they are integral to the economic solutions because the latter require national unity. Furthermore, Korea requires large amounts of foreign capital and technology during this stage of its development. And for these it must again compete with the other developing nations. Investors and lenders will continue to favor Korea only if they can count on the stability of an attractive business environment and social order. In this regard, recent events give cause for some degree of optimism. Dong-Ah Il-Bo (East Asia Daily) recently quoted General John A. Wickham, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, as pointing out in his testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on the defense posture in Korea:¹⁰

They are a good ally and the recent reaffirmation of our security commitment as well as cancellation of troop withdrawal should reinforce deterrence. The economic vitality of Korea, the lifting of Martial Law, the holding of national elections, increased internal stability and the continued firm commitment of the ROK to the maintenance of a full partnership of defense all bode well for the future.

The daily further quoted a U.S. weekly, Business Week, as reinforcing optimistic prediction about the future Korea's economic prospects:¹¹

Though the economic difficulties now facing Korea will take some time to clear up, Korea should succeed in its long-range strategy to become Asia's junior Japan.

2. Social Development: Now let us take a look at the social environment of South Korea. The creation of a democratic welfare state, the eventual goal of the Korean people, will take time. But they are doing their best to pursue this goal. In this regard, it is worthwhile to take a brief

review of what South Koreans have done to date, and of their plan to establish a firm base upon which to build a democratic welfare society in the 1980s, a society where honest citizens can enjoy their just rewards. There are many issues to be tackled, but for the sake of brevity my discussion will selectively focus on such basic issues as (a) population control, (b) employment, (c) housing, (d) health and medical services, (e) social security, (f) environmental protection and pollution control, and (g) the "Sae-Maul Undong" (New Village Movement).¹²

a. Population Control: The high rate of population growth in the 1960s (2.7%) was a factor impeding Korea's economic development and income growth. As family planning was made a priority program in successive economic development plans, it had dropped to an annual 1.9 percent. The rate was further reduced to 1.8 percent in 1975 and 1.58 percent in 1978. The population structure by age in the 1960s was pyramid-shaped, indicating a high age-dependency ratio. The average life expectancy began to increase in the 1970s and the figure for 1975 was 66.1 years, which is expected to increase to 72.7 years by early 1980s. The pattern of population increase is also gradually shifting to a spindle shape, as the crude birth rate and crude death rate are becoming smaller. It is thus inevitable that both the age-dependency ratio and the economic-dependency ratio are becoming larger and larger.

The current family planning program, which was started in 1962, will be even more vigorously implemented in the future with an eventual goal of keeping the population growth rate under one percent. The program includes a wide use of vasectomy, laparotomy, intra-uterine devices, condoms and oral pills.

In parallel to family planning, dispersion to overseas countries

is also encouraged. Since 1962, when the Emigration Law was enacted, until the end of 1978, a total of 341,157 persons had emigrated. The number includes 266,246 to the United States, 17,527 to Canada, 14,168 to Paraguay, 10,031 to Brazil, 4,597 to Sweden, 4,181 to Argentina, and 24,407 to other areas. In order to stimulate emigration, the government has converted the Overseas Development Corporation from a private to a government invested enterprise. Some 50,000 persons a year are expected to apply for overseas emigration, with an emphasis on Australia and South American countries. At the same time, technical, geographical and linguistic schooling for prospective emigrants is being given special attention.

b. Employment: As the nation's economic scope has widened as a result of increased exports, heavy and petrochemical industries have expanded, industrial infrastructures have developed, and a substantial portion of the labor force has shifted from agriculture to the non-agricultural sectors of the economy. All this has brought about a commensurate change in the structure of employment.

The number of employed people has constantly increased, and the government has assisted those looking for new job opportunities. This is done primarily by the provincial branches of the Administration of Labor Affairs. In 1978, the 35 labor office branches assisted 251,731 persons in finding jobs. Furthermore, the existing private job-placement offices have been reorganized into non-profit organizations. Concomitantly, the existing public employment offices have also been expanded in number. A total of 35 provincial-level consultative councils on unemployment were set up in areas where unemployment was prevalent or where the unemployment situation was unstable. The councils are to function with the cooperation of all related organizations and private enterprises in the respective areas.

In addition, the Overseas Employment Development Corporation was established to actively encourage overseas employment by helping explore employment opportunities outside the country. During the period of 1963 - 1978, a total of 324,000 Koreans found jobs overseas. Today, about 40,000 to 50,000 Koreans are working in the Middle East.

c. Housing: The housing problem in Korea has been made even more acute in recent years not only due to the overall population growth, but because of the transition from the "extended family" tradition to the "nuclear family" system, and because of the increase in the urban population as a result of the rapid economic development. As of the 1975 census, there were 4,869,000 houses for 6,754,000 households, creating a net shortage of 1,885,000 housing units. In 1972, to overcome this shortage, the government formulated a 10-year housing plan (1972-1981), and enacted a Special Law for the Promotion of Housing Construction.

During the Third FEDEP period, a total of 761,800 housing units (226,800 in the public sector, 533,700 in the private sector) were built, which is equivalent to 91 percent of the plan for 833,000 units. In 1978 alone, a total of 277,000 units were constructed, which brought the number of available housing units to 5,146,000 units for 6,349,000 households. A number of measures are being taken simultaneously to alleviate the housing problem. Principal among them are the securing of housing development areas in the suburbs of cities, emphasis on multi-family dwellings, and standardization of structural components.

Because the Fourth FEDEP stresses social development and welfare (unlike the economic-growth-oriented plans of the past), greater investments in housing construction are anticipated.

d. Health and Medical Services: Promotion of a high health standard is a goal and a means of social development. This goal is being sought through the multi-pronged policy extending medical care to all citizens (which includes the basic need of a drastic expansion of medical facilities), prevention of communicable diseases, improvement of the living environment and sanitary facilities, and upgrading of the quality of medicines.

e. Social Security: Social security in Korea can be discussed under three categories -- social insurance, public relief programs, and social welfare programs. In the category of social insurance are industrial indemnity insurance, medical insurance, and pension insurance. The latter includes the national welfare pension, civil service pension, private school teachers' pension, and military servicemen's pension. Public assistance programs include care for the socially helpless, temporary disaster relief, and veterans relief (for both military and police veterans). Social welfare programs are based on the Law for Social Welfare Service.

f. Environmental Protection and Pollution Control: The recent economic growth with its industrialization and urbanization has had detrimental effects on the environment. There has been marked contamination of the general environment, especially in the cities, rivers, and coastal waters. A single case is the Han River, which serves the capital city of Seoul. The pollution of the river is worsening due to the enormous amount of municipal sewage discharged by Seoul's 8 million population. A plan is presently under consideration to resolve the city's sewage problem.

Another important consequence of modernization is air pollution. In Seoul, which consumes roughly one quarter of the nation's total coal and oil requirements, statistics show that the incidence of respiratory diseases is six times higher for city dwellers than for rural inhabitants. In this

connection, the ROK government is conducting research to institute various measures to solve this problem, which include the creation of a new administrative capital, and the reduction of urban population growth through dispersal of industrial facilities.

The determination of the government to counter the pollution problem as well as to protect the environment is best reflected in the enactment in September 1977 of the Environmental Protection Law and the Marine Pollution Control Law. In all cases, however, the government appears to be well on top of the situation. So-called "green-belts" have been firmly and clearly established around large cities within which absolutely no new structures are permitted; the inner cities are continuously being renovated. Highway networks are constantly being expanded to bring the entire nation closer together; modern amenities are brought to rural communities under heavily subsidized programs; planned parenthood is given massive support; publicly-financed housing projects are vigorously implemented. And above all, laws and regulations are continuously enacted, reviewed, and revised to meet new situations.

Contamination of the environment is not a problem for the government alone, nor is it to be accepted as a necessary evil accompanying the nation's economic growth. The matter must be addressed on a higher plane than that of mere economic growth. Perhaps it is a problem surpassing the ideas of the quality of life as some economists and social thinkers advocate. Pollution is not a problem unique to Korea. Nor has it been successfully overcome even in advanced nations.

Korea has recently begun to tackle this question in earnest, as evinced in the enactment of the aforementioned laws. As she does so, however, she will do it with the same vigor with which she has approached other

major tasks in the recent past. For one thing, Koreans are too proud of their beautiful environment to allow it to go to seed. For another, the political philosophy that prevails in Korea today transcends mere modernization and economic welfare. Koreans are searching for harmonious satisfaction of the spiritual and material needs of the nation as a whole. It is the search for a communion with nature.

5. "Sae-Maul Undong": As the decade of the 70s unfolded, the cities in South Korea were moving ahead at a dizzying pace as a result of the successful implementation of two five-year economic development plans (1962-1971), while the countryside was still sunk in lethargy, passivity and even cynicism. Rural people were straggling behind their urban brethren. Something had to be done to correct this situation. The farmers had to be awakened.

The "Sae-Maul Undong" (New Village Movement) was introduced in 1970 to improve the rural socio-economic situation. In Korean, "sae" (새) means "new" and "maul" (마을) stands for "village," or "community." "Undong" (운동) means "movement" or "campaign." Therefore "Sae-Maul Undong" (새 마을 운동) is the New Village Movement in English terms. The basic conceptual foundation of the Sae-Maul Movement is to help rural people develop three virtues: diligence ("kun-myon" 勤勉), self-help ("jah-jo" 自助), and cooperation ("hyop-dong" 協同). It is a national modernization movement based on cultivating in the people's minds a spontaneous urge for national development by identifying it with self-betterment.

"Kun-myon" (diligence) was the first lesson to learn. The Sae-Maul Movement is a national movement to pursue a better and a more substantial life. No one can live better without working hard. This is particularly

true for the people like Koreans, who have very few natural resources, facing now as in the past difficult domestic and international problems. Everyone must work hard and acquire habits of diligence and thrift. To be rich without working hard is anathema to national development. The spirit of diligence must result both from and in an assured bright future. Thus voluntarily inspired hard work is an important ingredient of the Sae-Maul Movement spirit. Voluntary effort is bound to be accompanied by creative initiative, which means the desire and ability to make something new. Since the Sae-Maul Movement is dedicated to making the present better than the past, diligence is indispensable. Diligence fosters the spirit of saving and frugality; it rejects vanity, luxury and extravagance. It is natural that those who work diligently will want to save money and not waste what they earn. Savings not only improve living conditions but also lay the foundation for a vigorous national economy.

"Jah-Jo" (self-help) is too obvious to stress. This spirit originates in one's sense of pride and independence. Those who possess this spirit do not lean on others, nor do they shift their responsibilities to others, but they perform by themselves what should be done. The self-help spirit comes from perceiving one's self in a broader perspective, trying to solve one's problems with one's own efforts and with confidence in one's own ability, trying to develop self-reliance and independence, and trying to defend oneself from any pernicious factors in the environment. The self-help spirit thus encourages a sense of common destiny, which in turn promotes national solidarity and enhances national defense.

Since the Sae-Maul Movement also aims at bringing prosperity to those villagers who work for themselves, it naturally helps cultivate their awareness of communal and, eventually, national identity. In a more ge-

neral sense, it encourages national self-reliance, obviating dependence on financial assistance from foreign countries. In fact, the Sae-Maul Movement represents the Korean people's desire and effort to create a society in which each and every member is entitled to community help in the satisfaction of his human needs. In order that such a society may be created, all villagers are urged to participate in various community projects such as improvement of village roads, construction of bridges, and strengthening of embankment.

"Hyop-Dong" (cooperation) leads to solidarity. When villagers see what they have achieved by mutual cooperation, they feel firmly united. Thus they become convinced that there is nothing they cannot do if they cooperate with each other and unite as one. It goes without saying that a cooperative spirit is indispensable for successful fulfilment of the ongoing Sae-Maul Movement. The three basic components of the Sae-Maul spirit, i.e., diligence, self-help and cooperation, are inseparably related to each other. It is necessary, therefore, that the movement harmonize the three ingredients in the course of implementation.

The Sae-Maul Movement places particular emphasis on actual practice rather than words. It tries to teach the people that completion of the simplest task is worth much more than eloquent speeches or tons of paper. The concept of diligence, self-reliance, and cooperation is nothing new and not difficult to understand, but no one is qualified to talk about it unless he practices it.

The movement started almost accidentally and became quite sophisticated. As professors and academicians got involved in the movement, it became endowed with some theory. In order to better understand the movement, let us take a look at an anecdote which tells how this movement first

started.

The most abundant of Korea's resources is limestone; it was a natural progression, therefore, that in the initial state of economic development many Korean entrepreneurs began to utilize this abundant mineral resource in the manufacture of cement. However, the problem with cement is that it cannot be stored for a long time because of its tendency to coagulate. In 1970, cement was overproduced, with no sizable market available. The Korea Cement Manufacturers Association had to appeal to the government for help. They proposed that the government bail out cement manufacturers by buying up 300,000 metric tons of the product with deferred payment -- three years of amortization and installment with the fourth year without interest. The government, in turn, had to devise a way to utilize that cement. They found a simple solution; they shipped the cement to the villages, 335 bags for each. (The total number of "rural" villages in Korea is 34,665.) Now village people had to decide what to do with the cement. The government did not give them any guidance; they were just told to use the cement at their own discretion.

Villages summoned elders and leaders to determine how the cement could be used for the good of villages. Some villages used it for road construction. Some used it for construction of bridges across the creeks in their areas. Still some others built warehouses or meeting halls for common use. Some villages built small reservoirs in valleys with simple filtering devices and laid down plastic pipes to deliver each household. With this simple water supply system, we could eliminate water-borne diseases like cholera, dysentery, etc. Amazingly, more than 80 percent of Koreans living in rural areas today enjoy a tap water supply. This improvement not only liberated village women from their daily chore of taxing

potable water from a communal well but also brought about drastic changes in their daily lives.

One year after the allocation of cement, local government officials visited villages to see what they had done. Some villages were quite successful and their work was satisfactory, while some failed. Those villages where they built bridges were mostly doomed to failure. Without adequate planning and engineering know-how, the bridges built only with cement and labor were washed away during the next rainy season. Local government provided those villages with technical assistance and reinforcing steel bars to reconstruct the bridges. The government realized, however, that it could not extend help and advice to all of some 34,000 villages. Therefore, the government categorized them, selecting eight thousand in the beginning where it thought the program would be most likely to succeed. Herman Kahn describes the movement as follows:¹³

This also became a source of early criticism since it was obvious that they represented the least challenge and needed least assistance. But that was just the point; the secret of gaining the cooperation from the more skeptical or less ambitious villages was demonstrating that the program could work.

The measurable results of the Sae-Maul program indicate such spectacular success that it is impossible for any open-minded person to criticize it other than by nit-picking. Instead, the critics have ignored it. So far as we know, there have been no major articles about it in the prestige mass-media journals although they have devoted considerable attention and space to "alleged" political abuses and favorable attention to comparable socialist schemes. Part of the reason for this is that the Republic of Korea government itself has not tried to focus international attention on it, typically referring to it as a uniquely Korean program that cannot be fairly evaluated or emulated by foreigners (which in itself tends to create suspicion). . . . Economic development and the heroic achievements these people are making simply do not turn them on.

The above anecdote was introduced to reveal the true story of how Korea's Sae-Maul Movement started. There was neither a planned program nor precise objectives at the outset. The whole process of planning and imple-

menting any program adopted by them without its acceptance by its people. No top-to-bottom directives or guidelines were issued. This must have been a key factor in the success of the Saemaul Movement, which is a national campaign designed for the Korean people to get rid of the dark legacy of the nation's history and to bring about national modernization and development through concerted endeavours spurred by ardent patriotism -- not by theories and ideals but by action and practice.

3. Political Evolution: South Korea's form of government has been a subject of controversy in recent years. This is not to imply that such criticism is unjustified, but some of it seems to reflect idealism and a lack of understanding of Korea's political heritage. In the absence of such an understanding, it would appear almost impossible to establish standards of social or political development that might reasonably be expected for this or any other newly independent nation to achieve within a given period of time. If national development along certain lines is desired, then it seems necessary to recognize that some aspects of a national culture will almost certainly impede progress and as such must be removed. Others which stimulate progress might be substituted; however, it is equally important to realize that cultural traditions die slowly and new ones of value seem to be assimilated at an equally slow pace. Based on this, it would be appropriate to briefly examine Korea's political heritage and its influence on the current nature of its governmental environment.

a. Neo-Confucianism, the Yi Dynasty and Foreign Intervention:

At about the time the Magna Carta was signed, Korea was gradually succumbing to the Mongolian invasion. After suffering a long period under the despotic rule of the Mongols, the body of vassalage was broken and the Yi Dynasty was established. It was this dynasty and the Japanese colonial rule (1910-45)

which most heavily influenced the political culture and heritage of Korea. Following a period of court domination by decadent Buddhist monks, the Yi Dynasty sought some viable substitute which might aid in reconstructing Korean society. A principal hallmark of the new dynasty was its adoption of what was to be a long enduring state philosophy of "neo-Confucianism" in which the principal political tenet was a form of authoritarianism based on a hierarchically-arranged order of personal relationships within the society.

In effect, this concept of a hierarchical society caused the philosophy of absolute obedience to one's superior to become the principal basis of rule. Those elements of Confucianism that taught benevolence, wisdom, righteousness, and just treatment of subordinates rapidly eroded due to the practice of politics and, in general, only those aspects of the philosophy remained which served the ruler's self-interest. It thus became the vehicle of oppression for the mass of the Korean people and, ultimately, for the corruption of Yi officialdom.¹⁴ Based on this philosophy, it becomes apparent that the most powerful role one might aspire to in such a society would be a political position at the highest level of government. However, there were then always fewer positions available than were sought by an ever-increasing number of aspirants. This situation gave rise to fierce competition at the top of society without conceivable adaptation to the "rules of the game," which are the basis of the American democracy (i.e., a respect of Constitution, a respect of fair play, a respect of court decision and a respect of "spirit of compromise," and sympathy with the defeated competitor, and so on). Still another effect was the intensification of factionalism in society, in government, and, given the role of the family and clan in this philosophy, long-lived feuds were born.

Perhaps the best succinct description of the Yi Dynasty and its

legacy to Korean political development has been provided by Kim Kwan Bong:¹⁵

In summary, the traditional society of the Yi Dynasty was ideologically, socially, and politically an authoritarian society built on the principle of absolute obedience and dominated by patrimonial heads within a family and by feudalistic bureaucrats within the state. It was a society where individualism was stifled by familial and social status; where the mass of people not only were excluded from participation in government and social affairs but were also lacking any opportunity for social mobility; and where the government was of and for the privileged few, who were often corrupt and despotic and who were internally fragmented by vicious factionalism. This was, thus, a society that rigidly inhibited the evolution of individualism of ruling elites -- all of which contemporary Korean society has inherited as the most serious factors contributing to its social unrest and political instability.

In the declining years of the Yi Dynasty, from about the 1840s to the 1880s, the political scene in Korea was marked by foreign rivalries in which the Chinese, Russians, and Japanese vied for the position of most influence with the Korean court and cabinet. It was a period in which the court was divided with various factions favoring a particular foreign power while others advocated an isolationist position in the world. Such disunity in the court and cabinet contributed in no small measure to the discontent of scholars, those who felt socially oppressed and the traditionally impoverished and neglected peasants. The discontent caused this latter element of the population, by the mid-1800s, to cautiously, but willingly, support a movement that combined social and religious aspects and that was both anti-government and anti-foreign. Although slow to catch hold in the beginning, it ultimately grew to such proportions that China, at the invitation of the Korean government, dispatched troops to quell the rebellion. In reaction to the Chinese move into Korea, the Japanese, who had long coveted the peninsula, sought to block China and intervened in 1894. The short Sino-Japanese War was concluded a year later, with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which formally established Japanese hegemony over Korea. Immediately after this

authority had been established, Japan began to issue reforms for the Korean government, some of which were long overdue. Slavery, class structure, and civil service examinations were abolished, and some aspects of Westernization were imposed on the Koreans.

3. Japanese Colonial Rule: As a result of the Russo-Japanese War and the Treaty of Portsmouth, Korea became a Japanese protectorate. Later, under the Treaty for Annexation in 1910, Korea became a colony and every aspect of the Korean experience was to be affected by harsh, authoritarian, and bureaucratic Japanese colonial rule. All civil liberties were revoked. Private schools were closed and new ones were established by the Japanese in an effort to assimilate the young Koreans into the Japanese culture. Another example of the assimilation effort was the elimination of all study of the Korean language and history and substituting those of Japan. The Japanese also established and enforced economic relations that ruthlessly exploited the Koreans and were designed specifically to serve the interests of the Japanese landlord and businessman. Resentment and fighting among themselves, and with others, had left them factionalized and leaderless. And given the brutality with which they enforced their measures little could be done beyond sporadic, courageous, but pitiful, protest demonstrations for which the Japanese ruthlessly extracted a high cost for Korean patriotism in terms of death, injury or imprisonment. Such demonstration produced only little temporary freedom from the Japanese.

At the outset of Japanese colonial rule, those Koreans who held high government positions in the Yi Dynasty were replaced by Japanese officials and removed from government service or they were replaced and demoted to a much lower position. However, in spite of indigenous protests, some limited international outcry, and token concessions, the Japanese ma-

naged to effectively deny the Koreans any substantive, constructive involvement with either the political or economic development or management of Korea. In addition, they continued to systematically expunge all vestiges of Korean culture from the schools and even extended this effort by abolishing all Korean publications. Japanese names were forced on the populace, and Shintoism and Japanese concepts of Confucianism were introduced into the schools in order to exploit the authoritarian features of those philosophers. In general, the Japanese did little to change the traditional pattern of social rule in Korea. Even those well-placed Koreans who lost their high government positions or their lands continued to be held in high social regard. Kim Kwan Bong provides a good assessment of Japanese rule in his book:¹⁶

Aside from economic, cultural, and other imprints left by Japanese rule, the most important legacy was perhaps the introduction of the Japanese bureaucracy into Korea. It was a reimported model of the Prussian type, which was noted for its legalistic, rigid, and authoritarian traits.

c. American Military Government: After Korea's liberation from Japanese rule upon the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the American military garrison authority in Korea came to administer the part of divided Korea south of 38th parallel. The U.S. military government in Korea retained the Japanese bureaucracy as a temporary measure; this was inevitable because Koreans lacked experience in government and because the vacuum created by the expelled Japanese had to be filled post-haste. Although well prepared to establish military government in Japan, the United States was not prepared to effectively establish a similar administration in Korea, nor did it know exactly to whom it should turn -- to which resident or exiled-Korean -- to help it set this former Japanese colony on the road to self-rule. E. Grant Meade succinctly illustrated in his book how unprepared the U.S. military government was:¹⁷

Whatever the reason...they were not qualified...The XXIVth Corps had a long record of combat in Philippines and Okinawa...it had no experience in discharging civil affairs functions during the post-combat stage, and no conception of the problems to be faced in Korea. There was little or no briefing on the Korean assignment, and there was little information available on which to base it. The policy statements provided General Hodge were so sparse and ambiguous he was required to feel his way at every step.

After several decades of Japanese rule, the Koreans were totally unprepared to immediately establish a popular democratic government, although demonstrations and other expressions in the earliest days of American occupation clearly indicated this was what they desired. As noted earlier, the Japanese had thoroughly smashed all Korean indigenous groups on which a new government might have been built and they had, with equal effectiveness, destroyed or scattered throughout the world those persons who had some potential for national leadership. In the United States government there was a general lack of awareness concerning the nature, magnitude, and complexities of the problems facing Korea. If the American government had carefully adopted a more far-sighted view to the training and indoctrination of inexperienced Korean officials and politicians in such a way as General MacArthur did in Japan, and had not decided to implement a hasty withdrawal of its garrison troops, the situation could have been different and Koreans might have been able to make better start.

d. Factions and the Local Opposition: In the Western democracies, political factions normally give vitality and are considered vital to the healthy politics of a nation because they breed and perpetuate the "loyal position." It is this aspect of political existence that, in part, has caused the Western democracies to always insist that there be a set of checks and balance upon the power of the executive. Even in time of crisis, whether it was a period of martial law or the French state of siege, the legisla-

ture has in general acted in the spirit of the Magna Carta to preserve the supremacy of the law over the leader and to protect the people from abuses of power by the head of state.

Such a tradition has not been part of the Korean political culture and as a result they generally lack the experience and knowledge of how political factions deal effectively with each other for the common good of the nation. As mentioned earlier, there has been little toleration of the opposition in Korean politics. The Korean outlook on this problem has normally been that "those who are not for us are against us," and are thus obstacles to progress which must be neutralized. As the opposition weakened, the tendency has normally developed, for the sake of personal survival, to either go into exile or acquiesce to the actions of the head of state and the ruling party. Thus it now seems that when crises beset the Republic, the actions of President and the populace were somewhat predictable. Like most people when confused and threatened the Koreans resorted to those measures with which they were the most familiar and in which they had the most confidence. They granted their Presidents extra-ordinary powers. This was the first in what have since proved to be a long series of steps that have progressively led to the supremacy of the Presidency over the other branches of government.¹⁸

e. Political Culture in Modern Years: The Republic of Korea has, since its establishment in 1948, gone through five Republics:¹⁹ (1) the First Republic (1948-60), (2) the Second Republic (1960-61), (3) the Third Republic (1961-72), (4) the Fourth Republic (1972-March 1981), and (5) the Fifth Republic (March 1981-present).

Since the demise of President Park, the disorganized state of the civilian political structure and the fear of reduced control over the vola-

tility of the electorate resulted in the unwanted take-over by military supported "crisis-management government" led by the newly elected President Chun Doo Hwan, who prior to taking the presidential office initiated to reestablish social order by the crackdown on social "evils," and other decisive reforms in almost all fields of society including political, educational and other areas as a capacity of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Special Council for National Security Measures (NCNSM).²⁰ From the death of the former President to President Chun's election, the nation had an unprecedented rapid and quiet social reform aimed at eradicating evils of the past.

Koreans are aware that there is an arguable controversy among Western observers about the credibility of civilian control of the Korean military. We Koreans have so far gone through numerous external attacks, and suffered much from these invasions. After World War II, we were suddenly and, as I discussed earlier, without any appropriate preparation, exposed to Western mores, which were quite strange to us. In terms of geopolitics, the nation could easily be assimilated with neighboring countries. However, we were not assimilated with them at all. Despite numerous invasions by neighbor countries in the past, Korea has intrinsically maintained her legitimacy and traditional culture, thus retaining her identity as a Korean nation-state. But we have never enjoyed peace and freedom without external interruption.

We have always been under authoritarian rule either by our own Kings or colonial rulers. We have neither been trained nor been thrust upon to govern ourselves by our own public initiatives. The only opportunity to function autonomously was the one given to us by the United States. During and after the Korean War, the first priority was to build up our military forces. Americans concentrated their efforts on training and educating

Korean military personnel. For this reason we have a high quality of leadership exhibited within the military. Although we have civilian students and scholars trained and educated in Western countries such as America, England, and France, leadership training is not a matter of knowledge alone. It is a complex matter of practice, mentality, duty-mindedness and so on. All our military academies are modeled upon the U.S. service academies at West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs. We study almost the same curriculum as American cadets. Our quality after graduation from the service academies is compatible with that of Americans.

In my observation, American democracy is one of the most ideal and humane political systems. Yet it has many weaknesses. American democracy can hardly work without being preconditioned to two premises: wealth and maturity. Until we become wealthy as a nation and the political maturity level of our electorate becomes compatible with that of Americans, we must seek a way to remodel one of the existing democratic political systems which best suits our own social and political environments.²¹

What is important is not how good are the laws or models we make, but how competent we are in the recognition of a responsible and dedicated leader, and what type of leader is ideally suited to lead our people at this particular time of our history when most of our Korean people only talk about "political democracy" without knowing the basic formula that before we try to practice political democracy we must first practice democracy as a way of life. For a people having experienced living in the tradition of a Confucian way of life where obedience has been the first virtue of the subject for so long in their history, only thirty-six years (since the end of World War II) is too short a period of training to become naturalized in "democracy as a way of life." Besides, geopolitical situations, the

national division and economic constraints, among other factors, dictate the necessity of powerful and dedicated leadership. The assassination of President Park in October 1979, coupled with challenging international situations including the oil shock and constant harassment from the North, has resulted in a difficult period for us. To a certain extent the situation could be comparable to that of Americans in the 1930s. We need a competent leadership such as that exhibited by President Roosevelt. We need a Korean Roosevelt. Ultimately, the legitimacy of political leadership does not turn mainly on elections and constitutions and representative processes; it stems from the capacity of the leader to establish an accountable relationship with the genuine needs of followers.

4. Issue of Human Rights: The writer fully subscribes to the assertion the pursuit of human rights will be fundamental aspect of America's foreign policy regardless of change of administration.²² But one of the most controversial foreign policy issues during the Carter Administration was human rights. The effort to make human rights an essential standard of U.S. foreign policy, while establishing it as a pre-condition for every relation with other countries, has been difficult and demanding.

According to Current Policy No. 198 (13 June 1980), "U.S. Commitment to Human Rights," Ms Patricia M. Derian, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the Carter Administration, made a statement about South Korea in her address before the American Association of University Women in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on 12 June 1980:²³

...if some of South Korea's generals are determined to establish a dictatorship, economic and moral pressure may not be sufficient to dissuade them from this goal

Ms Derian should have considered Korea's historical and cultural background

prior to making such an unfair and short-sighted remark. Koreans have always been under authoritarian rule either by kings or tyrannical colonial rulers as discussed earlier. Without a sincere effort to understand the cultural and political environment of her country's important ally, Ms. Derian fails in her attempt to perceive the human rights issue in Korean terms. She should be more constructive in her criticism of the military, not always placing undue emphasis on the military factor, but looking at the competence of the individual.

Her remarks seem to conclude that civilians, simply because they are civilians, simply because they are not military, would eliminate authoritarian government rule. She would do better to recognize the qualities of leadership in the context of the time and place it is exhibited. Ms. Derian should remember the time is 1981, the place is Korea, and our government, be it under military or civilian control, will in essence be Korean. Korean military leaders are in most cases trained at service academies similar to U.S. academies, i.e., West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs. Although they are instructed in military doctrines, science and logistics, the curriculum is expanded to include institutions and principles of democracy. The end result is that our leaders coming from within the military are well oriented in democratic principles and democratic integrity.

Americans are very logical in their thinking and therefore they are very effective in communicating with logical minded people. But American logic very often fails when confronted by an illogical mind. It requires slow and steady progress to make the transition between logical and illogical understanding on all issues. Patience is a virtue Americans must bear as a world leader. Human rights is not America's own invention.

It is universally known. The Third World people also know it well. But they are too involved in building their own nations, and struggling with priority issues such as economic advancement and national security. South Koreans have basic rights mentioned by Ms. Derian in her address, such as food, shelter, health care and freedoms of movement, religion and education. The Korean geopolitical situation is totally different from that of Ms. Derian's own country. South Koreans are under constant threat from the North, only less than three minutes flight by MiG fighters. Imagine a situation in which you have Russian fighters on alert at Dulles airport and you are watching them from the White House. The Korea Herald quoted Ernest W. Lefever as saying:²⁴

The United States should not use punitive sanctions, such as the withdrawal of economic and military aid, from friendly but authoritarian foreign regimes because of human rights abuses...the most effective way to get reform is "quiet diplomacy" and the maintenance of friendly relations...The United States should remove from the statute books all clauses that establish a human rights standard as a condition that must be met by another government before our government transacts normal business with it, unless specifically waived by the president. We have no moral mandate to remake the world in our own image. It is arrogant of us to attempt to reform the domestic behaviors of our allies and even of our adversaries.

This writer fully subscribes to Ernest W. Lefever's philosophy of handling the human rights issue.

As mentioned earlier, human rights are not America's own invention. It is universally known that American people's traditional values, such as pluralism, the rules of the game, balanced authority and respect of human rights, are fully recognized. But in the process of the implementation of its human rights objectives, America should develop a long-term conceptual framework so that it can get rid of such harsh impressions as: "Attention world, America has just achieved a marvelous human rights coup." It is not a publicity gimmick or public relation trick. What it is and ought to be is

an honest humanitarian effort. America will have to continuously pursue it but in a more prudent and subtle tone without setting higher standards of conduct for her friends than for her enemies. In this respect the Reagan administration has adopted a realistic attitude, and aligned on a less controversial track with less public emphasis on this issue. Although this position is slightly late in coming, it will prove effective in at least minimizing unnecessary controversy in U.S. foreign policy.

CHAPTER IV

INTERESTS OF MAJOR POWERS IN KOREA

1. Interests of the United States in Korea: As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put it, "The U.S. support of South Korea is essential to the security of North East Asia, as Japan sees the security of South Korea as intimately related to her own security." American involvement in Korea cost the U.S. a staggering \$189 billion in the period of 1945-1976, much of it Korean War expenses and veterans payments which were simply recycled within the American economy, but about \$12 billion was economic and military aid to South Korea.¹ Today South Korea is the only foreign country other than West Germany where a full U.S. division is stationed.

Past rationales for this commitment -- such as containment of alleged Soviet and/or Chinese expansionism -- are no longer functional. Instead, the rationale is given in terms of two related factors: prevention of armed unification by North Korea and protection of Japanese security. What is emphasized is a firm American commitment to the status quo, to maintaining the Korean peninsula in peace and stability by reducing North-South tensions and deterring a renewal of large-scale military conflict. This is directly linked to her geostrategic interest in the preservation of regional stability and the avoidance of conflict with China or the Soviet Union.

Equally important is the recognition of the dynamic growth of South Korea's economy by U.S. observers. Economically, South Korea is now America's big trading partner, and, as Secretary of Defense Brown notes, U.S. trade with the East Asia region is now at a higher level than with Europe.

In comparing the Japanese and U.S. stakes in Korea, one is left

with the conclusion that it would be specious to draw sharp distinctions between specific Japanese or U.S. interests on the peninsula. In one sense, Japan has a more pronounced interest in avoiding military conflict, given its proximity to Korea. But, on the other hand, the United States has far more to lose in view of its direct combat involvement. U.S. taxpayers pay about \$700 million annually to maintain American troops in Korea, and have spent a total of \$12 billion (as mentioned previously) on their upkeep since the Korean War ended.²

The United States had cumulative direct investments totaling \$434 million as of 1977. A more accurate measure of the extent of U.S. economic interests in South Korea is suggested by the fact that \$2.5 billion in private credits from U.S. banks were outstanding as of 1978. In addition, Seoul owed \$1.45 billion in government loans to the United States. More than 80 percent of foreign bank loans and credit lines to South Korea banks came from private multi-national banks, a large percentage of them American-based. The fact that the largest U.S. banks choose to lend to borrowers in South Korea is indicative of their faith in their government's commitment, and of the nebulous nature of distinctions between private and public involvement. If U.S. involvement in such multi-national institutions as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, both of which treat South Korea as a favored case, is taken into account, the U.S. role in sustaining stability of South Korea becomes even greater.

Significantly, most of the Japanese firms with investments in Korea are small and medium-sized enterprises, in marked contrast to the U.S. situation. Gulf Oil Company alone sells more than \$1 billion per year in crude oil to South Korea and has a \$200 million at stake in refining, fertilizer production, and petrochemical manufacturing facilities. The United

States maintains a \$2.3 billion military base infrastructure, which is continually being refurbished. The nature of these U.S. vested interests is such that abandonment would represent an even greater economic loss than Japan would suffer in the event of a North Korea takeover. Most of the U.S. economic stake in South Korea is in the form of equity investment, whereas Japanese economic involvement is predominantly in the form of technical assistance and licensing arrangements. The latter would be less directly affected than equity holdings, should expropriation occur, since much of the Japanese export trade with South Korea consists of raw materials and components for Japanese-linked enterprises that would still be needed even if the enterprises concerned were operated by the state.

It is not hard to understand why the United States is dissatisfied with having to keep approximately 39,000 soldiers in South Korea. The United States would like to avoid the persistence of a situation in which it would be automatically involved should a military conflict erupt on the peninsula. It is also reasonable for the United States to conclude that South Korea's impressive progress in economic and military development should make it possible to reduce the U.S. military burden. But it is questionable whether the United States should try to change the situation by itself, when Japan, China and Russia all desire the maintenance of status quo. Although Carter's withdrawal policy was understandable from the viewpoint of U.S. domestic politics, as foreign policy it was hard to avoid designating it as being extremely naive. It is fortunate that the withdrawal program has been suspended and the Reagan administration has officially confirmed it as a dead issue.³

2. Interests of the Soviet Union in Korea: In discussing the Soviet interests in terms of the factors of inherent changes taking place between

South and North Korea, the following preconditions of changes in the Soviet strategy toward the Korean peninsula have to be considered:

The first condition is whether the Soviet policy makers are considering the Korean peninsula as a geopolitically and strategically important region. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union had recognized Korea as an important factor in formulating its foreign policy prior to the Korean War. Accordingly, the Korean peninsula had played an important role for its security. The Soviet Union had recognized its aid to North Korea as its absolute obligation, and had exerted allout efforts to maintain a pro-Soviet regime in North Korea. But, from the latter half of the 1950s, especially since the death of Stalin, the Soviet attitude has developed into a diverse strategy based on the so-called peaceful coexistence line. It is a fact that the Soviet Union considered its aid to North Korea in its strategy for revolution in South Korea to be important; however, she attached more importance to rapprochement between the major powers and to the development of the Third World. This change implies the Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula, especially toward North Korea, connotes limitation and flexibility. In other words, the importance of the Korean peninsula in terms of Russian national interests seems to be waning (after their failure of military unification of the peninsula) from the standpoint of comparison to other regions. It has become a fact that the Soviet Union does not want an unbalanced status on the peninsula as she now considers the region to be a buffer zone. For this reason, it is fair to say that the Soviet Union is sensitive to the attitude of the U.S., Japan and South Korea toward North Korea.

The second condition is the problem of priority in the Soviet foreign policy. In the process of foreign policy formulation from the Khrushchev period to the present, the Soviet Union sought to gain the maximum benefits

of its goals while recognizing what limits were placed upon these goals by the realities of international politics. The Soviet Union, which learned a bitter lesson from the Korean War, realized that it is advantageous to itself to employ a flexible policy; therefore it abandoned its previous hard line.

The third condition is the problem of variability in the Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula under the state of confrontation between the Soviet Union and Communist China. During the honeymoon period between the two communist powers, their policy toward the peninsula was consistently a policy of unification through their active aid to North Korea, but the Sino-Soviet confrontation, which came to the fore in the late 1950s, developed into a relationship of mutual restraint and alienation. As a result, the structure of North Korean leadership split into three factions, namely, the pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and internal factions. Accordingly, Kim Il-Sung, in his effort to free himself from his involvement in the Sino-Soviet confrontation, selected his own independent policy line.

In short, the Soviet and Chinese view on North Korea may be homogeneous, when viewed in terms of their aid to revolution, but the triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, which follows the trends of changes in international environment, connotes some irreconcilable points, when viewed in terms of preference for national interests. The progress of relations between Communist China and North Korea will actually determine the Soviet attitude toward North Korea. Since its failure in its effort to achieve armed unification through the Korean War, the Soviet Union has lent verbal aid only to numerous North Korean proposals, and has not offered any unification policy.

A series of North Korean provocations from 1968 to 1969 and up until

recently (including the seizure of the Pueblo, the downing of the EC-121, and the 1976 tree-cutting incident in which two U.S. Army officers were slain by North Korean troops in the DMZ) was not committed under Soviet pressure. At the time of negotiations in 1961 for a mutual aid agreement between the Soviet Union and North Korea, the Soviet leaders clarified to the North Korean authorities that it would not provide any aid to North Korea for a second Korean War or a large-scale Vietnam-type guerilla warfare.⁴

The Soviet attitude toward North Korea until 1971, when an announcement on the preliminary talks of the North-South Korean Red Cross Conference was made, was primarily verbal aid based on its moderate policy line. Meanwhile, as for the Soviet reactions to the plenary session of the North-South Korean Red Cross Conference, the Soviet Union supported the stand of the North Korean regime; but its comments were comparatively moderate, basically emphasizing the phase of the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula. For example, Pravda on 5 November 1972 commented:⁵

Through the conference, tension between North and South Korea should be relaxed, military clashes should be avoided, and the problem of carrying out the measures agreed upon between North and South Korea with regard to their foreign policies should be settled.

It may be interpreted that the Soviet Union was evidently desirous of progress in the North-South dialogue and that it is a significant expression of a principle of stabilizing the status quo on the basis of equality between South and North Korea.

Kim Il-Sung presented the so-called Korean Federation System as a unification plan on June 23, 1973, to counter the Special Statement regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, declared by President Park on June 23, 1973, as a transitional and provisional measure for the peaceful unification of the peninsula. The North Korean plan is generally similar in contents to its peace proposal presented by North Korea during the

1960s to achieve propaganda effects. Accordingly, the Soviet reactions to the North Korean plan were not different from those to the earlier proposal. A Moscow broadcast observed on July 27, 1973:⁶

The plan is another major proposal by the Korean government to be applied for easing tension on the Korean peninsula and in the Far East and at the same time for unifying Korea on the peaceful and democratic foundation.

Moscow did not comment on the contents of the North Korean plan at all. This alludes to the fact that the Soviet Union shows a trend of approving of progress in the status quo, evading expressions provocative to both South and North Korea as much as possible.

The Soviet Union, taking a stand based on its policy for relaxing tension, kept step with other countries concerned in passing a resolution at the 28th U.N. General Assembly Political Committee meeting. Observing Soviet policy toward the North-South relationship, we might make the following assumptions:

First, the Soviet Union asserts ostensibly a relationship of alliance with North Korea in handling the problems of South and North Korea, but lays emphasis on maintaining the basic lines, i.e., reconciliation and relaxation of tension.

Second, as it is the Soviet stand to regard the Korean peninsula as a buffer zone for adjusting the dynamic relationship between the major powers, the Soviet Union does not want to see a conflict occur on the peninsula and wants to stabilize the status quo as much as possible.

Finally, it is appropriate to view the Soviet attitude toward the motives and objectives of the North-South Korea contact as affirmative at this juncture, because the Soviet Union does not believe that the peaceful contact between two Koreas will create any conditions disadvantageous to the Soviet Union, in terms of the function of mutual restraint to adjust

the dynamic relationship among the four major powers -- the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Japan -- which surround Korea.

3. Japanese Interests in Korea: Professor E.O. Reischauer, a liberal critic of U.S. government policy and the former U.S. ambassador to Japan, once made a very trenchant and pointed out remark about Japanese interest in Korea:⁷

The United States has no direct strategic interests in South Korea, nor would a unified Korea under Communist leadership be a hegemonic extension of either Chinese or Russian power but rather a Korea more able to resist both. What is chiefly at stake in South Korea, apart from our concern for the well-being of the Koreans themselves, is the security of Japan.

An assessment of Japanese and U.S. interests in Korea is inevitably something of a circular exercise. The Japanese debate over Korean policy hinges to a considerable extent on divergent assumptions with respect to the future U.S. posture; conversely, the U.S. debate over whether to disengage from Korea has become, to an even greater extent, a debate over the nature of Japanese interests in the peninsula. Defenders of the U.S. presence contend that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to a militarized, possibly nuclear-armed, Japan, while advocates of disengagement respond that a withdrawal in gradual stages would not critically affect Japanese defense or foreign politics. Both Tokyo and Washington, in varying degrees, have tended to view relations with Korea as ancillary to relations with each other; the dynamic growth of South Korea's economy is gradually leading U.S. observers to see more clearly a direct interest in Korea.

When one does focus squarely on the Korean problem as such, it soon becomes clear that Japanese and U.S. interests are largely congruent. At present, the governing interest of both Japan and the United States in Korea lies in reducing North-South tensions and in preventing a renewed

large-scale military conflict in which either of the two countries could become even directly involved. This goal is directly linked to their broader mutual interest in the preservation of regional stability and the avoidance of conflict with China or the Soviet Union. For both Japan and the United States, the danger of renewed conflict in the peninsula poses a continuing threat to their efforts to improve relations with Peking and Moscow.

As regional neighbors, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union all have an overriding interest in preempting control of Korea by any of the others. This interest is not served by the current polarization between the Japanese-backed South Korea and the Chinese- and Soviet-backed North Korea. On the contrary, the safest situation for all concerned would be the emergence of patterns of their external dependence, presentation of a common front toward all outside powers, and movement toward eventual unification. Here we see the parallel interests of the United States and Japan sharply underlined. The ultimate interest of Washington, like that of Tokyo, lies in the emergence of a strong Korean buffer state able to stand up to both of its Communist neighbors.

Most Japanese appear less fearful of an eventual Communist triumph in Korea than of two other possible outcomes. One would be a conflict entailing U.S. intervention that could in turn embroil Japan militarily, complicating relations with other powers. The other fear involves precipitate U.S. disengagement from the South that would not allow Japan time to reshape its approach to the peninsula. In particular, there is concern in Japan that a new Korean conflict could seriously strain U.S.-Japan relations. Although the United States would expect Japan to support its military operations in Korea during a renewed conflict, as an obligation under

the Mutual Security Treaty, what should be emphasized is not the danger to Japan from the North, but the profound apprehension that such a conflict may draw Japan into a conflict with China or the Soviet Union.

Apart from the political implications discussed so far, economic interest is equally important. The Japanese economic role in South Korea has resulted in the growth of significant vested interests in the business sectors of the two countries, as well as powerful political lobbies linked to the economic groups involved. Given the size the economic stakes have reached during the past decade, it is clear that the protection of existing vested interests in the South will be a major objective affecting future Japanese policy toward Korea.

As of 1977 a total of more than one billion dollars was invested in the various South Korean industries by Japanese companies. In assessing the significance of Japanese investment, it is important to recognize that Japanese companies often exercise informal control over South Korean enterprises through dummy partners and technical assistance (for example, licensing agreements), as distinct from equity investment. A study from 1971 through 1974 indicates that Japanese parent companies controlled South Korean enterprises with combined assets of at least \$1.7 billion and possibly as much as \$2.1 billion. Two-way trade between Japan and South Korea reached \$8.5 billion in 1978 (with a \$3.3 billion surplus for Japan), much of it in the form of components and raw materials for Japanese-linked companies.⁸

4. Chinese Interests in Korea: The joint U.S.- China communique issued at Shanghai, 27 February 1972, at the conclusion of President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC) is quoted as follows:⁹

The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support

efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula.

This implies PRC clearly does not intend the armed unification of the Korean peninsula by a repetition of the 1950 war. On the contrary she prefers that unification come about by peaceful means. There is good evidence to support the opinion that China was embarrassed by North Korea's capture of the American radio ship (Pueblo) in 1968 and again when the American reconnaissance plane EC-121 was shot down in 1969.

In the late 1960s, China's reaction to her worsening relations with the Soviet Union was to turn her attention to seeking friendly relations with America. China appears to recognize that it has become no longer advantageous to collaborate with North Korea to Communize the peninsula. Premier Chou En-Lai was reported to suggest in his interview with the visiting New York Times vice-president, Mr. James Reston, in August 1971 that the state of the Korean War Armistice Agreement be terminated and replaced by a peace treaty between the two opposing sides in the peninsula.¹⁰

In fact it is a well known secret that China would prefer to keep the American influence in the peninsula (providing it did not threaten her own security) rather than create a vacuum of power which might well be filled by Japan. Foreign Report of 31 October 1973 commented:¹¹

American troops could remain in Korea under a bilateral agreement with the South Koreans and with the tacit agreement of the Chinese who told Dr. Kissinger that they would not object to the American forces staying on.

All these considerations keep the Chinese from inciting North Korea to any acts of aggression against the South. For the foreseeable future, they will remain so much concerned about their domestic modernizing goals that their necessity for trade with other nations, particularly their interest in the introduction of Western (mainly American and Japanese) technology,

will strongly discourage them from involving themselves in any intransigent hard line. The one billion people of China have begun to participate in playing an international role in maintenance of global peace and stability. Long-standing tensions between China, Japan and the United States have been replaced with sincere dialogue and consultation. For the first time in a century, these three major powers enjoy cooperative relations. But history does not allow us to be too optimistic about them.

In fact, Communist China's policy toward the Korea peninsula is the most unpredictable among several issues of China's foreign policy. This is because Chinese decision makers are faced with two contradictory requirements. The first is their interest in a peaceful international environment. In this respect, Chinese leadership is supposed to support stabilization of the peninsula and want better relations with the ROK. They might be interested in "cross recognition" scheme to resolve the dilemma in this part of the world.¹²

The second requirement, however, works somewhat inversely to the first. China has to support the position of North Korea. The support is necessitated for two reasons. The first is the necessity to compete with the Soviet Union in wooing the North Koreans. Since North Korea is in an immediate position between China and the Soviet Union, China cannot offend North Korea for fear of losing the country to the Soviet side. The other reason is that the importance of North Korea in the nonalignment movement is increasing for China especially after the death of Tito. As a result of this political dichotomy, China's position on the Korean peninsula is rather ambiguous. On the surface, they support North Korea's position, but in reality, they seem to be interested in the status quo. Repeated statements by Chinese leaders on the calmness of the situation in the penin-

sula are eloquent of such intent.

In the long run, however, there are some factors which may change China's policy toward Korea. For the sake of brevity, the writer is going to discuss only three factors and deduce some perspectives without going into details.

(1) Relaxation of Sino-Soviet conflicts. In this case, China and the Soviet Union would not have to compete to woo North Korea, and instead, would be able to apply joint pressures on North Korea. The problem created here would be Soviet intentions in the Far East. If they adopt an activist policy in this region, their Korean policy might not promote stabilization. If that is the case, China would have difficulties in coordinating with the Soviet Union.

(2) Changes in North Korea's role in^a nonaligned movement. This would become possible either through changes in North Korea, including the change of leaders, or through changes in the movement itself such as Sino-Vietnamese relaxation. If such changes are to occur, China would not necessarily support North Korea with regard to solutions in the peninsula.

(3) Remarkable economic progress of the ROK. China is searching for models for their modernization. For this reason it pays attention to the United States, Japan and West Germany in the West, and Yugoslavia and Hungary in the East.

In a nutshell, it may not be far from truth to say that Communist China's tendency to avoid major military involvements will in all probability continue until its domestic socio-political situation has been stabilized, until its human and material resources have been organized on a more effective basis, and until it really has reached "super-power status" socio-politically and militarily.

5. Quality of Collaboration between America, Japan, and China:

Unity among the United States, Japan and China in opposing Soviet efforts to dominate Northeast Asia is the key to maintaining peace and stability in the Korean peninsula as well as in East Asia. A Soviet military build-up in Siberia, where it faces no external threat (except chronic minor border conflicts with China), obviously is not defensive, but aimed at expansion. The possibility of the Soviet Union provoking a world war in the early 1980s is fairly small, but the danger of it stirring up local disputes is increasing.

Europe remains the key point in Soviet strategy, but Soviet expansion efforts in Asia and the Pacific are increasing as it seeks ultimately to drive the United States out of Europe, the Asian mainland and Africa. The Soviet Far East strategy would be to first gain strategic superiority in the Western Pacific, giving it an around-the-world capability to control the sea lanes through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea to the North Atlantic.

The Soviets seek to surround and isolate China, neutralize Japan and control the Southeast Asian nations. In Europe, Moscow is setting up a strong military force while trying to lull the West European nations with detente and to break up the U.S.- West European alliance. Meanwhile, it is trying to utilize turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa to enlarge its sphere of influence and outflank Europe. Moscow also aims to control raw material and fuel supplies for the United States and Europe and, through the Far East, to gain two approaches to the Persian Gulf. Though it is unlikely that a military alliance linking China with Japan and the United States can have long term viability, their common strategic interests require coordinated action against Soviet expansion for the time being.

CHAPTER V

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

1. International Situations Surrounding the Peninsula: Japan has broadened and strengthened her relationship with China since the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship in August 1978. The unfolding of the new link between Peking and Tokyo has occurred at a time when Japanese spokesmen have noted with growing apprehension the building up of Soviet land forces and naval capabilities in the Asian-Pacific region. China announced, on the 3rd of April 1979, that it would not extend the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in view of the relationship that is evolving between Peking and Tokyo.

Although these events hold important implications for the Republic of Korea, of most immediate consequence is the shift in American policy, announced on the 21st of July 1979, toward postponement (later frozen by President Reagan) of the earlier decision to withdraw all American ground troops from South Korea. But the highlight of President Carter's trip to the ROK in 1979 was the proposal, set forth by the South Korean and American governments, for the convening of a three-way conference on Korea, although proposals for a new dialogue were put forward both by Seoul and Pyongyang in January 1979 following the full normalization of Sino-American relations announced in December 1978, and at the time of the visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to the United States.

In retrospect, it appears that the proposed U.S. troop withdrawal was incompatible with a U.S. initiative which favored tripartite talks with the ROK, the U.S., and North Korea. By January 1979, the U.S. government had completed the analysis that led to U.S. intelligence estimates of the

magnitude of the North Korean military buildup. If the removal of remaining U.S. ground forces would have been counter to the U.S. diplomatic initiative for the proposed three-way conference, the initiative seems to have confronted formidable, and perhaps insurmountable, obstacles from the outset for even more fundamental reasons. The interests of the United States and the Republic of Korea diverged as sharply in 1979 from those of North Korea, as they did when Dr. Kissinger (in the period of 1975-76) proposed four-power negotiations with the two Koreas, the United States, and China.

In the 1975-76 period, both China and North Korea quickly rejected the latest initiative, and Pyongyang reiterated its long-standing demands for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military capabilities from the Korean peninsula. Here, as in other dimensions of its foreign policy, the position of North has been consistent: to seek a dialogue with the United States from which Seoul would be excluded and to remove remaining American military power from Korea in order to weaken the Republic of Korea, and to enter into negotiations with Seoul from which the United States would be excluded.

These twin themes were apparent in Pyongyang's rejection of the U.S.-ROK proposal for three-way talks on the grounds that South Korea is not entitled to participate in talks between North Korea and the U.S. on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty because the ROK is not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement. At the same time, Pyongyang has held that U.S. participation in a dialogue between North Korea and South Korea would represent interference in internal Korean affairs. Pyongyang has long harbored the goal of direct negotiations with the United States, but with the ROK excluded -- as part of the broader campaign to divorce Seoul from Wa-

shington just as it has striven to detach the United States militarily from its firm ties with the Republic of Korea.

Perhaps because of President Carter's 1975 commitment to the withdrawal of U.S. forces while still a candidate for the presidency, North Korea initiated a series of secret contacts even before the new (Carter) administration had officially taken office. But the contradiction in an American policy simultaneously in favor of negotiations with North Korea and the withdrawal of ground forces should have been evident. The prior announcement of U.S. force withdrawals left no basis for a North Korean quid pro quo in negotiations on the future of intra-Korean relations, either in the form of equivalent military cuts or in a basic shift in Pyongyang's longstanding policies designed to weaken and ultimately destroy the ROK.

While the United States stressed its commitment to force withdrawals, North Korea continued to augment its military capabilities in an effort that extends back to the early 1970s, and which has occurred despite, or in tandem with, the periodic expressions of interest in bilateral talks with the ROK. The contradiction in U.S. policy was evident in the fact that the United States would probably not have gained the support it needed for such talks, either in the Republic of Korea or elsewhere, without a postponement of U.S. plans for force withdrawals, especially as evidence of the North Korean arms momentum mounted. In turn, as the prospect for U.S. force withdrawals diminished, the most important incentive for Pyongyang to enter such talks was reduced and the North Korean interest in the U.S. diplomatic initiative was removed.

By late July 1979 the United States, and President Carter himself, had become the object of increasing vilification in the North Korean propaganda machine. Mr. Carter was denounced by North Korea as a "vicious

political mountebank and shameless hypocrite."¹ This stridency in Pyongyang's anti-U.S. policy contrasted sharply with the atmosphere of detente that was apparent to visiting Americans in the North Korean capital at the time of the international table tennis championship in April 1979. Under present circumstances, it is as difficult to envisage any peaceful unification of the two Koreas as it is to foresee the emergence of one German state in place of the post-World War II division. Pyongyang remains unreconciled to a division in the Korean peninsula that leaves North Korea inferior to South Korea in all but military capabilities, with the economic gap steadily widening to the advantage of the ROK.

North Korea continually probes for areas of weakness in the South. It places hope in the notion that the withdrawal of U.S. force would somehow produce political instability and reverse the remarkable economic advances registered by the ROK over the past generation. There is no evidence that North Korea, with its Stalinist regime and backward economy, ruled by Kim Il-Sung, and the ROK could be unified short of a fundamental transformation of the political and economic system of North Korea or the communization of South Korea. Since the rulers of North Korea cannot be expected to preside over the liquidation of a regime that they themselves have created, the unification of the Korean peninsula by peaceful methods remains a chimera. North Korean policy toward the South has contained an inherent contradiction. While seeking a new relationship with the United States at the expense of, and excluding, South Korea, Pyongyang has engaged in a massive military buildup directed only against the ROK. In fact, it was the North Korean military buildup, more than any other consideration, that led the Carter administration to its decision first to halt and then to postpone indefinitely further U.S. force reductions from the Korean

peninsula.

Perhaps no more than we can fully divine Soviet intentions in light of the massive growth of Soviet military power that has occurred during the 1970s, we cannot infer North Korea's plans from its impressive arms programs of the last decade. Both the Soviet Union and North Korea have given such high priority to military forces that they have placed a heavy burden on their economies. In contrast to the vaulting economic growth of South Korea, North Korea's massive military programs have reduced its economic growth rates to levels of stagnation. The indigenous weapons production capabilities that North Korea has built, together with the on-going efforts to harden vital war waging and war survival assets, provide the means for the conduct of warfare, at least in its early stages, largely independent of China or the Soviet Union.

Normalization among major powers in the Asian-Pacific region -- especially China, Japan and the U.S. -- is often said to have diminished the prospect for conflict in the Korean peninsula. But counter-argument of this assumption was articulated by General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, in his annual report on U.S. Military Posture FY 1981:²

North Korea has the capability to execute a large-scale invasion of the ROK and could constitute an immediate threat to US forces there. Further, the recently analyzed buildup in North Korean military capabilities is troublesome. Particular dangers could arise if North Korea perceives disunity in the ROK.

While continuing to give at least verbal support to Pyongyang, the Chinese have provided no hints that they could, or would, influence North Korean policies toward the ROK. Conceivably, neither the Soviet Union nor China would support a North Korean attack on the ROK. Perhaps in part for this reason, North Korea has striven relentlessly, especially since the early 1970s when major power normalization was initiated, to build a capacity

for independent military action. Even if either China or the Soviet Union was able to restrain North Korea, the mortgaging of the security of the ROK to the Sino-American relationship would be a slender reed indeed upon which to base U.S. foreign policy interests in the Korean peninsula -- interests which are linked inextricably to the broader power balance in Northeast Asia.

Transformations in the Sino-American, the Sino-Soviet, or Soviet-American relationships would have destabilizing consequences of profound importance within the Korean peninsula. Conversely, the forceful reunification of Korea by Pyongyang would hold equally ominous implications for relationships among the major powers.

To an unprecedented extent, the ROK's security interests are set in a geostrategic context that extends far beyond the Korean peninsula as a result of her vast economic growth since the early 1960s. In the years ahead, this broadened security perspective is likely to be reinforced by the growing importance of the ROK as a major world trading nation. For this reason, the ROK must share with Japan increased concern about Soviet military power in the Asian-Pacific region, and especially the growth of Soviet naval forces that will enhance the Soviet capacity for power projection into maritime routes of vital importance to the United States or its allies. For example, the deployment in the Pacific of the Minsk, a Kiev-class VSTOL guided missile carrier, Soviet naval access to the Camranh Bay base in Vietnam, and the augmentation of the Soviet Pacific Fleet with other new capabilities pose a threat to U.S. strategic planning in the Asian-Pacific region, and to the commerce of countries such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. By no means has the balance of naval power in the Asian-Pacific area shifted to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the growth of Soviet military power complements the longstanding Soviet interest in an Asian col-

lective security system "to make Asia a continent of peace and cooperation" in the Soviet view. Like North Korea, in its policy toward the Republic of Korea, the objective of Soviet diplomacy is the withdrawal of the residual American military presence and the neutralization of the Asian-Pacific region. The Soviet Union will continue to intensify its military programs in the Asian-Pacific region and this Soviet military buildup has to be countered in order to maintain an acceptable political-military equilibrium in the region. Constant provocations of North Korea and persistent buildup of Soviet military power in the Asian-Pacific region reinforce the need for the ROK, as well as Japan and the U.S., to consider their security relationships in broader geostrategic perspective.

This need will become even more apparent in the 1980s as a result of the ROK's increasing international economic interests, Japan's dependence upon the sea lanes for her economic survival, and the vital importance attached by the United States to Northeast Asia. The ability of the United States to fashion a creative diplomacy in its relationships with China, Japan and the Soviet Union will depend, in no small measure, upon the preservation of strong links with the Republic of Korea.

2. Military Environment: On the Korean peninsula, more than one million regular troops of South and North Korea confront each other across a 4-kilometers (2.5 miles)-wide, 250 kilometers (155 miles)-long demilitarized zone (DMZ). The Korean peninsula remains one of the world's tensest regions of military confrontation, with a recent history of repeated armed provocations. North Korea is now deployed so that it could launch offensive armored warfare against Seoul from one of three major attack corridors with less than 48 hours warning. Defense Secretary Brown said in his annual report for fiscal year 1982:³

North Korea has undertaken a sustained military buildup during the 1970s, which, relative to its population and economy, exceeds anything else in the region and poses the main military threat to stability in Northeast Asia... .

Although ROK land forces are only about 20 percent smaller than North Korea's, the North Korean Army's greater numbers of armored vehicles and artillery give them a great deal more offensive shock power than the ROK Army... Another danger is the possible infiltration of North Korean "Special Purpose Forces" into ROK rear areas where logistics, air defense, and tactical air support facilities are located. Those that manage to infiltrate would have to be countered by ROK rear area security forces... .

Seoul is only about 25 miles from the border, and within two to three hours of a North Korean armored assault. Far more of North Korea's total military manpower is located in offensive armor and artillery units near the DMZ than South Korea's. North Korea's air forces are better dispersed, and better sheltered. Its air defenses are better postured to defend its ground forces, and are located where they can support an offensive at the DMZ. South Korea's air defenses are scattered and postured for city defense. It is beginning to develop effectively equipped units of defense against North Korea's extensive commando forces. South Korea lacks the armor, anti-armored weapons, armored mobility, and self-contained air defense to rapidly check a North Korean attack. The border defenses supporting North Korean forces have much greater firepower than those supporting South Korean forces and have the shelters and facilities to limit warning to South Korean forces.

North Korea has massively improved its relative force strength during the last decade. There are four major reasons why estimates of the balance have shifted in North Korea's favor:

- (1) North Korean emphasis on military expenditures and South Korean emphasis on economic development.

- (2) A consistent North Korean effort to build up peak offensive military capability rather than a balanced force structure and sustaining capability.

(3) A lack of focus and direction in the U.S. military advisory and assistance effort, and a lack of an independent South Korean capability to develop plans and forces designed to Korean needs.

(4) South Korean reliance on US military presence and commitments for deterrence, and contingency support.

The most critical reason behind the shift in the balance is the massive North Korean effort to improve its military forces, and to improve their offensive posture and capability. For instance, during the period of 1966-1975, North Korea spent more than \$2.1 billion on military forces than did South Korea. This is an excess of 40 percent more over a ten-year period, but U.S. intelligence estimates of Communist military expenditures consistently tend to sharply underestimate the level of effort involved in terms of the cost of a comparable effort in the West.

South Korea's GNP increased from \$7.5 billion in 1966 to \$17.9 billion in 1975. It is now more than three times the 1966 figure in constant dollars. North Korea's GNP increased from \$4.4 billion in 1966 to only \$6.4 billion in 1975. This is a disastrously low rate of growth for a developing nation. South Korea's GNP was 1.7 times that of the North in 1966, and it was 2.8 times that of the North in 1975 as a result of the ROK's emphasis on economic development under the American protection. North Korea spent an average of 13.3 percent of its GNP on military forces during 1966-1975, while South Korea spent 4.2 percent. North Korea was thus devoting 3.2 times as much economic effort to military buildup during the decade, and four times as much during the first five years. It is obvious North Korea was committed to levels of military expenditure that went far beyond defense, as previously pointed out by Defense Secretary Brown.

North Korea armed at a rate designed to give it the capability to attack the South. On the other hand South Korea could have spent more on defense during the last decade. However, she adhered to U.S. policy which stressed economic, not military, growth.

Until 1973, the U.S. encouraged South Korea to maintain large infantry forces, even though North Korea was investing in forces to fight a short and highly armored war. Americans felt that to provide South Korea with sophisticated weapon systems might result in South Koreans using such systems in a provocative manner against North Korea; therefore the emphasis on manpower was enlarged. As a result, South Korea averaged a higher percentage of men under arms than North Korea even though it could field far fewer divisions, tanks, artillery, aircraft, and ships. North Korea spent an average of two times as much per man under arms as South Korea during the period of 1966-1975, and this allowed the North to concentrate far more of its resources on improving its combat equipment and increasing its fighting "teeth."

The result is not surprising that South Korea, with more manpower, a larger defense expenditure and aid failed to keep pace with the North in developing basic elements of fighting capability. While North Korea built up massive armored forces, and gave them superior artillery and attack support, the U.S. focused on using Korean forces in Vietnam, improving the defenses of islands and peripheral territory in the North, and turning ROK units into lightly mechanized infantry and air defense fighters. U.S. policy and advisors failed to provide anti-armor capability, offensive ROK air capability to stop North Korean armored mobility to redeploy ROK forces to meet the main-line of a North Korean attack, artillery to counter North Korean emplacement at the DMZ and superior artillery strength in

combat units. South Korea also has difficulty in coping with North Korean airborne and commando forces which are anticipated to infiltrate into the rear area of South Korea flying such low speed aircraft as AN-2s at low altitude.

The imbalance of military forces between the two Koreas was the result of South Korean emphasis on economic development as well as the result of U.S. advice, but the U.S. did not want a South Korea it could not control, and few U.S. advisors sought a South Korea that could fight its enemy as distinguished from a South Korea made over in the U.S. image. Further, the U.S. often pressured the ROK to buy American when foreign systems were more effective. For example, it pressured the ROK into coproduction of the ineffective U.S. Vulcan weapon rather than the more effective Oerlikon guns it might have had at the same price.⁴

This approach to U.S. and Korean planning began to change when Lt. General James F. Hollingsworth was appointed to command I Corps Group (US-ROK) in July 1973. (I Corps Group is a field Army of 13 divisions: 12 ROK and 1 US.) This field Army occupies 175 kilometers (110 miles) of the DMZ and Han River estuary. It guards all of the major avenues of approach into South Korea and the capital city of Seoul. General Hollingsworth used his command position to restructure US and ROK strategy to meet the North Korean threat. He originated the short war strategy known as "The Forward Defense."⁵ Unlike the previous emphasis on infantry and air defense, the short war scenario was based on the use of high volumes of artillery and airpower for the first five to ten days of the war. Secretary Schlesinger and General Richard Stilwell, the then Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command in Seoul, gave this new strategy strong support, and by 1974-75, it had led to the following detailed U.S. and ROK force requirements:⁶

- (1) Provide the artillery and ammunition at the border to counter North Korean artillery and halt North Korean armor.
- (2) Improve ROK armor and anti-tank weapons.
- (3) Improve ROK air defenses, and air base sheltering and dispersal.
- (4) Improve tactical airpower/artillery firepower coordination and capability.
- (5) Improve and construct new forward defensive fortifications.
- (6) Inspired spirit of offensive minded defense.
- (7) Re-posture ROK forces to defend the border with improved mobility and reserves.
- (8) Improve 24-hour operational capability.
- (9) Revitalize ROK training and morale.
- (10) Re-organize and equip ROK counter-guerrilla and commando forces to defend against North Korean attacks.
- (11) Provide heliborne mobility and anti-tank capability.

These plans had achieved significant success by 1976. But they had scarcely succeeded in equipping the ROK to match North Korean capabilities, or to deter and defend without the use of U.S. forces.

a. The North Korean Military Posture: North Korea is concentrating efforts on the modernization and expansion of armaments in accordance with the four major military guidelines adopted in the early 1960s, which call for (1) promotion of all troops to leading officers (战士干部化), (2) modernizing the army (军. 现代化), (3) arming the entire people (全人民武装化), and (4) fortifying the entire nation (全国土要塞化). North Korea's military potential centers around a ground force of some 700,000 troops in 25 divisions, with about 2,000 tanks.⁷ Airpower consists of some 600 combat aircraft, mostly MiG-15/17s

and MiG-19s supplemented by about 120 MiG-21s.⁸ Naval forces include guided missile patrol boats, torpedo boats, amphibious assault craft and submarines. It seems that North Korean ground forces are characterized by armored units emphasizing concentrated strike power (two armored divisions and five independent armored regiments). Guerrilla warfare is emphasized, and for this purpose North Korea appears to be training special purpose forces. North Korea also possesses powerful reserve forces centered around the Red Worker-Peasant Militia (劳农赤卫队), which are constantly maintained at high state of preparedness so as to be quickly and efficiently transformed into the regular forces.⁹

Initially, North Korea forces were mainly supplied with Soviet weaponry. As a result of the nation's advances in industrial technology, however, domestic weapons production capability has been increased. North Korea presently equips its forces with both domestic and foreign (mainly Russian and Chinese) weapons as it steadily upgrades and expands its military hardware.

Presently, North Korea maintains about 14 divisions with powerful artillery support deployed near the DMZ, and some North Korean artillery and surface-to-surface missiles are thought to be deployed withing striking range of the capital city of Seoul.¹⁰

b. The ROK Military Posture: South Korea is strengthening its defense capability within a background of high economic growth under the U.S.-ROK defense cooperation system. ROK ground forces total some 560,000 troops in 20 divisions with some 900 tanks.¹¹ Airpower includes about 350 combat aircraft, mainly F-5 day-fighters and some F-4 swing fighters.¹² In addition, South Korea maintains naval forces equipped with destroyers and missile ships, fundamentally charged with coastal defense and land operation support by its amphibious forces.

The nucleus of ROK armed strength is the army, composed mainly of infantry divisions. Unlike the North, it maintains no tank divisions. For military equipment and logistics support, the ROK is steadily promoting domestic weapons production and improvements in its own supply system. With assistance from the U.S., the country is in the midst of a building-up program of military capabilities, particularly in the development of domestic arms. South Korea succeeded in test-firing missiles and rockets in September 1978, and this achievement has attracted considerable attention from abroad, in particular from Japan.

Most of the ROK army is deployed within a few dozen miles of the DMZ. Because the capital city of Seoul is located only 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the nearest segments of the DMZ, various defense facilities have been established to strengthen the defense system of the capital.¹³

The largest defense problem for South Korea is the geographical proximity of the capital city to the DMZ. The critical issue is not the defense of all its territory but its defense capability to stop North Korea's combined-arms advance before it reaches Seoul. Even a temporary loss of Seoul could be fatal because of the psychological and political impact upon the ROK's leadership. Such a loss could reduce confidence in the ROK government at home and weaken its bargaining position in the event of intra-war negotiations, while at the same time allowing the North Koreans to reap the diplomatic benefits of a prompt cease-fire. In other words, they would try to secure some political and diplomatic gains by calling for a cease-fire in place.

c. Comparison of Both Capabilities: The North is superior in armor and air strength, mainly tanks and fighter aircraft. In addition to regular divisions, the North maintains the Red Worker-Peasant Militia in a

Military Force Balance Comparison *
(As of July 1980)

	<u>N. Korea</u>	<u>S. Korea</u>
Population	17,580,000	38,200,000
Personnel:		
Active forces	678,000	600,000
Reserve forces	338,000	1,240,000
Ground balance:		
Tanks	2,600	860
APC	1,000	570
Anti-tank	2,400	180
Shelling capability:		
Artillery multiple rocket launchers	4,335	2,000
Surface-to-surface missile Battalions	4	2
Mortars	9,000	5,300
Air Balance:		
Jet combat aircraft	615	362
Other military aircraft	360	212
AAA guns	5,500	1,000
SAM battallions	40	5
Navy combat vessels**	494	75

* The Military Balance 1980-81

** N.Korea has 16 submarines (WW II,diesel)

state of readiness so that it can be immediately employed into the combat.

North Korea has an overwhelming quantitative superiority in combat aircraft, as compared to ROK's higher-performance aircraft such as F-4 and F-5E.¹⁴ Because North Korea has a strong guerrilla warfare capability, the ROK will have to call up considerable numbers of regular forces to cope with such guerrilla warfare.

Concerning logistic support, the ROK is far distant from the United States, but can receive immediate assistance from American forces stationed in the country and in the Pacific area including Japan/Okinawa. On the other hand, North Korea has the advantage of border contiguity with both the Soviet Union and China, and is said to be further strengthening the survivabilities of its military facilities. One geographical disadvantage of the ROK is the location of the capital city of Seoul, which falls within the range of North Korean SSM's, while North Korea's capital of Pyongyang is located well north of any direct firepower threat from the DMZ.

e. The U.S. Military Posture in Korea: The available unclassified information on the relevant U.S. military forces in South Korea is summarized: Approximately 39,000 U.S. military personnel are now stationed in South Korea, of which 32,000 are with the 8th Army and 7,000 with the 314th Air Division.¹⁵ The principal components of the 8th Army are the 2nd Infantry Division, the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, the 4th Missile Command, the 19th Support Brigade, and units performing the intelligence, command, communications, and control functions. (See the table in the next page.)

The 13,500 men of the 2nd Division have been placed in reserve behind the front line but astride the main invasion corridors leading to the capital city of Seoul. The Division's location is of critical importance, because any attempt to seize Seoul would almost certainly entail engaging

the 2nd Division.

The U.S. 2nd Infantry Division performs two functions -- defense and deterrence -- which are clearly summarized by Nathan N. White:¹⁶

First, the Division is well equipped and, by all accounts, well trained and highly motivated. As such, its war-fighting capability is not inconsiderable and certainly is greater than that of any South Korean unit of comparable size. The contribution that it would be likely to make to the defeat of a North Korean attack may well have been dismissed too lightly by some American commentators.

Second, any U.S. president would be extremely reluctant to risk the decimation of a unit of this size because, under combat conditions, it was denied the support of other U.S. military forces. Almost all observers agree that an attack on the Division would be very likely to trigger the use of massive extrapeninsula U.S. forces. This means that the 2nd Division has a deterrent value out of proportion to its size. Whatever differences there may be over the importance of the increment to the combat effectiveness of allied ground forces that the Division represents, there is a general consensus that its contribution to deterring another war is much greater than would be its contribution to fighting that war if deterrence failed.

The 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade has been responsible for its air defense missiles against North Korean aircraft: Nike-Hercules and Improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles. In accordance with plans formulated under the Ford Administration, the Brigade is in the process of being deactivated, and all of its missiles are to be turned over to the Republic of Korea. Transfer of the Nike-Hercules battalion has already been completed.

The 4th Missile Command has been equipped with Honest John and Sergeant surface-to-surface missiles. The function of the Command has been to provide battlefield support for allied ground forces. The principal mission of this unit has been to deliver tactical nuclear weapons if called upon to do so by the U.S. President. The Command is also in the process of being deactivated, in accordance with planning guidance adopted during the Ford Administration. The Sergeant battalion has already been withdrawn

to the United States; the Honest Johns are still being transferred to the ROK Army.

The 19th Support Brigade is responsible for logistic support of all U.S. military forces in Korea, for ensuring that American-supplied weapons and materiel would continue to flow to the South Korean armed forces in time of war, and for maintaining the facilities that would be required to support the U.S. military forces based outside Korea that might be called upon to come to the assistance of the ROK in the event of an all-out North Korean attack.

Given that the North Korean armed forces apparently are capable of launching a major offensive with little or no warning and that South Korean intelligence evidently is not yet capable on its own of doing an adequate job of monitoring North Korean behavior for signs of an impending attack, the role played by U.S. intelligence units is very important. Adequate warning time will be most critical for a successful defense of Seoul.

Equally important are the functions performed by the U.S. personnel responsible for command, control, and communications. Authority over the 8th U.S. Army, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and the United Nations Command/US-ROK Combined Forces Command has been consolidated. This means that U.S. officers have not only had operational command over the South Korean armed forces, but have also exercised a powerful influence over the development of the doctrine and plans in accordance with which the allied forces are prepared to conduct the defense against a Communist attack. These officers are in a position to monitor and control the activities of all allied forces in South Korea, and would be largely responsible for carrying out the extremely complex task of integrating operations to bring to bear the maximum possible force against an invading North Korean army.

The second major element in the U.S. force presence in South Korea is the 314th Air Division. The principal combat element of the Division is one wing of 60 F-4 fighter aircraft.¹⁷ In addition, there are a number of OV-10 light ground-support/forward air control aircraft. The key mission of the U.S. airpower in Korea is to assist the South Korean air force in delivering the maximum possible close air support to the allied ground forces fighting to defeat a North Korean attack on Seoul. To accomplish this, it will be necessary to win control of the air space over the main battle area north of Seoul. Success in winning air superiority and delivering large numbers of effective close air support sorties and interdiction strikes is deemed extremely important. Thus the 60 U.S. F-4's now in South Korea are viewed as an extremely important adjunct to the South Korean air force.

CHAPTER VI

KOREA'S POSITION IN THE POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOUR MAJOR POWERS

1. Korea's Paradox of Dependence and Interdependence: The end of World War II signaled the end of colonialism. The dissolution of Western overseas empires made way for the entrance of scores of new states into the international system, and decolonization created the underdeveloped world as a new international political force. New states, new problems, and new politics emerged as part of the contemporary international environment.

The history of Korea is an illustration of the paradox of independence/nationalism and interdependence/internationalism. Throughout history, Korea has been caught between Chinese, Russian and Japanese imperialistic ambitions. These three countries exercised control over Korean nationalism, trying to subvert any Korean ideology, pride and individual love of country. Through this period Korea never ceased in her efforts to emerge as a nationalistic society, free of the restraint of any nations touching her boundaries.

At the conclusion of World War II, Korean ambitions for nationalism and independence appeared to be within reach. Such was not the case. Artificial division into North and South Korea by the Soviet Union and the United States frustrated Koreans' long cherished nationalistic ambition, the establishment of an independent and unified nation-state. Despite the division of the peninsula, North and South Koreans desperately sought unification. Russian agitation and ensuing conflict (the Korean War), however, further divided Korea and thwarted any attempt for unification. Can it be that only one super power can bring a divided nation into an alliance framework?

The ideology of Korea will always be Korean, neither Russian nor American. South Korea through a succession of governments is working industriously toward the unification of the peninsula. But the battle can only be half won until the nation as a whole can compromise and deflect the influence of the super powers. A compromise between the super powers would be the first step in an attempt to reunify Korea. As the governments of North and South Korea compete for recognition in the international system, the demand of security and the international interest of those powers surrounding the Korean peninsula are still a vital concern in the formation of the foreign policy of either Korean government. In other words, economic agreements with neighboring nations are affected. No balance of trade agreements can be established with either China or Russia, and trade with Taiwan is inhibited by external power influence (i.e., the United States, the Soviet, and China).

The necessity of American military support and presence in Korea is another example of the restraint upon Korean freedom of action. Questions of status quo, North-South unification dialogue, war and peace are as much matters of American policy as they are South Korean policy.

There is no comprehensive rationale in international politics. Each country acts in its own best interest. Korea needs unity, solidarity, and a strong united dynamics to further its cause of nation-building. Nation-building will lead to the development of political and economic independence. Although Korea needs the American "security blanket," recent developments in international politics have proved there can be no absolute guarantee of security from outside influence. That each country is required to have minimum survival capability is a reality in today's world.

The paradox for Korea in its quest for independence is that achieve-

ment of minimum self-reliance requires considerable dependency on foreign resources and technological assistance. Ever advancing technology and ever increasing demands on the world's resources have shrunk the geographic, social, economic, and political distances that separate states and have vastly multiplied the points at which their needs, interests, ideas, products, organizations and policies overlap. The overlap condition can best be exemplified by the need for oil imports -- one hundred percent in the Korean economy. Although Korea does not stand alone in its dependence upon imported oil, this example enhances the paradox of independence and interdependence.

Most of South Korean heavy industry was developed in a joint venture with multi-national corporations of advanced industrial countries such as the United States, Japan, France, Britain, West Germany and Holland. An example is the growth of the shipbuilding industry in South Korea. (Hyundai Shipbuilding Company ranks ninth in the world's shipbuilding industry as of 1978. Korea's shipbuilding capacity is hopefully projected to exceed that of Japan by 1991.) Under the joint venture with the United States and France, South Korea has one nuclear power plant operating today. By the end of 1991, the end year of the 6th Five-Year Economic Development Plan, more than 45 percent of Korea's electric power will be supplied by ten additional nuclear power plants. However, the acquisition of nuclear fuel from outside sources is fraught with difficulties because of possible linkage with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, another difficulty encountered is the control of many foreign investors engaged in the Korean economic development, diluting the Korean government's capacity for governance of those foreign enterprises, in particular subsidiaries of multi-national corporations.

How to successfully and effectively cope with the existence of the forces of independence and nationalism along side the forces of interdependence and internationalism is a key issue and paradox of our times. In today's world, politics and foreign policies have become closely interwoven. The notion of national interest becomes increasingly difficult to use effectively. Nations, which because of strategic location, strategic resources, and, at times, ideological convictions, are inevitably dependent upon support of outside powers, are not always able to exercise nationalism and independence in their full meaning.

State power is no longer absolute as in the past. It is safe to say that absolutism of sovereignty in today's world is gone. The dichotomy in world politics between independence and interdependence and nationalism and internationalism will remain a challenge, emphasized by the multi-polarization of world power.

2. Major Tasks and Future Prospects: Situations surrounding the Korean peninsula urge more than ever the interlocking goals of the Korean people -- national security, economic well-being, and political development -- and these tasks have to be pursued simultaneously and vigorously.

a. National Security: Our first priority is maintaining peace and stability and preventing war on the Korean peninsula. Peace is a universal desire transcending time and space. For Koreans who experienced tragic fratricidal warfare, it is an absolute and unconditional imperative. We South Koreans live under constant threat of armed invasion from the North. During the past ten years, North Korea has aggressively built up arms, as mentioned in previous pages, dug infiltration tunnels, and sent guerrillas and provocateurs into the South. North Korea remains the most tightly closed, highly regimented, and ideologically militant Communist regime in the world today.

Maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula requires us to have adequate military strength to deter armed invasion by North Korea. Koreans have been aided in their defense efforts through the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. We are deeply thankful to the American people and their government for making common effort with us to deter North Korean aggression. Particularly, we are gratefully pleased to hear President Reagan officially reaffirm America's security commitment to Korea, thereby sealing the fate of the former President Carter's controversial effort to withdraw U.S. ground troops from the divided Asian peninsula.

Although vital, military strength alone is not sufficient for durable peace. It can be achieved only by fostering an atmosphere of trust and understanding between the South and the North. For this reason, President Chun Doo Hwan extended an invitation on 12 January 1981 to Kim Il-Sung of North Korea to come to Seoul.¹ President Chun reaffirmed this invitation during his recent visit to President Reagan. President Chun solemnly proposed that the highest authorities in the South and North exchange visits in order to provide an epochal opportunity to restore a sense of trust between the two sides and to preclude a recurrence of tragic, fratricidal war, offering a historic moment to unconditionally resume the suspended dialogue to open the way for peaceful unification. The path to unification is not paved by unilateral proposals rich only in rhetoric, nor by written promises that are not kept; it is paved by the restoration of trust. Making a renewed and historic peace initiative, we Koreans in the southern half of the peninsula are convinced that an avenue to the solution of any arising or pending problems between the two sides can be found if only Koreans steadfastly work to narrow our differences. This can be possible following a historic exchange of visits between the highest autho-

rities of both halves of Korea, aimed at building up mutual trust precluding a fratricidal war and resuming a dialogue that can lead to peaceful unification.² We hope and we are sure that our great ally, the United States, will certainly support our effort. But it is also important for the Koreans to recognize the artificiality of the partition of their country; from the outset it was not Koreans but those major powers who arbitrarily designed to divide the peninsula. "God helps those who help themselves." No one can be more seriously concerned about the urgency of unification than Koreans, and it should be they who initiate every effort toward achieving it.

b. Economic Well-Being: Our second priority is continued economic development and growth. For Koreans, economic development is not only an important task but also an urgent one. Indeed, it is a prerequisite for the prevention of war and protection of national integrity. Sustained economic growth is essential to ensure that our armed forces are adequately supplied and our people secure in their livelihoods. A prosperous nation is the surest way of forcing North Korea to abandon its designs for military conquest.

Despite many obstacles, we have achieved remarkable economic progress and growth over the last two decades. We have made constructive use of the help we received from the United States to free ourselves from poverty, and our economy has become one of the most successful among the world's developing countries. We acknowledge with gratitude American economic help and support and this gratitude will be handed down to posterity in the future so that our descendants will never forget to appreciate what their forefathers owed to America in the process of their nation-building.

As we are poorly endowed with natural resources, we have to depend mainly on our human resources for prosperity. We also have to depend on the expansion of trade. This sometimes causes misunderstanding, even among our friends, that we are exporting at the expense of our trading partners. Nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is that we have always imported more than we have exported. During the past several years, we have liberalized imports even further. As a result, we have had a surplus of imports over exports through the years in our trade with the United States. We hope that our trading partners, particularly the United States, will recognize that trade with Korea provides mutual benefits, and they will continue to understand the contribution of trade to peace and stability in Korea.

c. Political Development: The third major task facing the ROK is the achievement of political and social stability. Stability is necessary for any society. But Korea is especially aware of its importance as a result of our unhappy experiences during the past year. Our recent political instability has been exploited by the North Korean Communists. Furthermore, it has had serious economic repercussions. Due to the chaotic situation last year, our economy not only lost its momentum but even temporarily contracted as mentioned earlier.

There is no magic formula for maintaining political and social stability. When domestic order and stability are in immediate danger, it is necessary to take firm measures to affirm governmental authority. But we also know too well that genuine stability can be achieved only when the majority of the people accept the legitimacy of the government and support its decisions. Our democratic political institutions are still weak, and at times our people find it difficult to achieve consensus, not because

we lack enthusiasm and sincerity but because we are still relatively unsophisticated and immature politically.

We are optimistic about Korea's political development because the Korean people have high aspirations for democracy. In the past, our search for a democratic polity followed paths which often were contradictory. The Korean people pursued at the same time freedom and social responsibility, individualism and order, change and stability. This resulted in conflict and tension. However, through their recent political experience they have learned that extremist actions are highly destructive. The Korean people are beginning to perceive and apply wisdom and maturity in politics. Political evolution should be sought within the context of equilibrium and orderly progress. Political strife in Korea in the 1970s resulted mainly because one person held the reins of power too long. This stagnation of power caused a decay within the political scene. Even the constitutional order was arbitrarily changed for this end. Democracy to the Korean people does not necessarily mean the American model, but it means one thing above all -- that is the guarantee of a peaceful transfer of power. When this principle is established and adhered to, other controversies and disputes will be resolved patiently and productively within the constitutional framework.

d. Fifth Republic: The Fifth Republic started when President Chun Doo Hwan took his presidential office last March. President Chun and Korean nation he leads face formidable challenges on three fronts as mentioned earlier -- politics, economics, and security-foreign affairs -- as Korea enters a new era in its age-old history.

Political commentators tend to stress the more salient items on the agenda of the Fifth Republic such as rooting out corruption, restoring

credibility, establishing legitimacy, and building institutions suited to the indigenous culture. These are all vitally important tasks, to be sure. However, to concentrate upon them exclusively risks ignoring the forest for the trees. Over the next seven years, President Chun must steer the Korean ship of state through an especially treacherous passage, avoiding equally the Scylla of political upheaval and the Charybdis of economic decline. If, as he has promised, the vessel is brought safely into port--an anchorage labelled "democratic welfare society" -- he will have proven himself a far better helmsman than any of his predecessors.

Metaphors aside, the central dilemma of modern Korea can be stated in a few words: how to reconcile free and stable political institutions with the imperatives of economic growth and national security. The history of all non-Communist industrial democracies tends to prove that political stability is impossible without the development of economic-interest-based mass parties. Korea does not now have, and has never had, even a simulacrum of these. On the other hand, the premature emergence of such parties can trigger a rapid escalation of competing demands on the society's resources potentially fatal to sustained growth. The politicians are forced to outbid each other in order to retain and expand their special interest constituencies. When they run out of spoils to distribute, they simply inflate the currency, thus creating an artificial surplus to distribute anew. Of course this can only continue for so long. Eventually, the economy goes into a tailspin and even temporary "winners" begin to see through the game.

Can the Republic resolve its dilemma and forge the institutions it needs for stability without endangering the foundations of its economic success? A look at the recent past may provide some insight.

political culture bears the imprint of long centuries of Yi Dynasty rule as mentioned in the previous chapter. For over five hundred years, all governmental authority radiated outward from Seoul, and the population consisted of only two classes: the "yang-ban" (兩班. roughly equivalent to English gentry), and the great mass of peasants ("pyong-min" 平民). Individual mobility into and out of the "yang-ban" class was common, but no general movements of social forces took place in the stagnant agricultural economy. While the peasantry remained politically inert, the "yang-ban" expended their energies in unending court intrigue and factional struggles. This form of political life lacked any demonstrable ideological or class referents. The game was played for its own sake and for the psychological and status gratifications it offered.

As late as the Second Republic (1960-61) -- even later, many would argue -- Korean politics had not changed all that much since Yi Dynasty times. Rampant factionalism, constant party switching, and chronic lack of discipline tragically weakened the regime, precipitating the May 16 military revolution. Even the authoritarian "Yushin" (維新 Revitalizing Reform) system, launched by President Park in 1972, proved unable to eradicate Korea's besetting political evils.

Fortunately, the new constitution approved 22 October 1980, includes certain built-in safeguards against a repetition of past mistakes. However, the only certain cure for faction-based politics is a politics based on economic-interest groups. "Joong-jin" (重鎮. "top-heavy") parties of legislative notables always incline toward factionalism, whereas a party firmly rooted in an economic constituency tends to develop discipline and cohesion. The long-term influence of such parties acts to stabilize society as a whole and to peacefully integrate newly-emergent and

hitherto-excluded groups within the system. British and American democracy, for example, developed largely through the evolution of parliamentary factions into countrywide mass parties.

As a result of the last twenty years' economic growth, Korea now finds itself endowed with a social structure infinitely more complex and variegated than that which President Park inherited in 1961. The faction-ridden politics appropriate to a static, bifurcated society no longer serves the needs of a dynamic industrializing nation. In short, Korea's political maturation has failed to keep pace with its burgeoning economy. The resulting gap can only be bridged by the advent of a modern-style party system, as envisioned in the new constitution.

The fledgling Fifth Republic seems pregnant with such a development, although the actual birth will probably come by Caesarian section. So much depends on timing. Move too quickly and the flood tide of demands swamps the available resources, culminating in the systematic breakdown. This is simply a large-scale version of what results when improvident farmers slaughter their breeding stock and eat up the next year's supply of seed corn. But move too slowly and the pressure cooker of social discontent, denied an escape valve, begins to build toward an explosion.

This writer wholeheartedly hopes that God may bless Koreans for their desperate efforts to accomplish as early as possible what other advanced countries achieved after decades or centuries of political evolution. We are well aware that it will take time and we will be patient. England, for example, took almost two hundred years to negotiate the transition from parliamentary factions to mass parties. And during most of that period it faced little serious economic competition and security threat from outside. The United States did likewise in a shorter span of time,

cushioned against foreign imported economic shocks by its relative distance and resourcefulness. Korea enjoys no comparable margin of safety at all. Although an export-oriented state like South Korea can be highly sensitive to the slightest turbulence from outside, a stable and self-sufficient economy can be insulated from all but the most severe political tremors.

The Fifth Republic set the nation an ambitious goal: the construction of a democratic welfare society. Democracy means in particular modern mass political parties, and a welfare society, at least in our Korean context, can only be erected on the foundation of expanding export economy and securing national defense. How these often conflicting desiderata are reconciled will shape the next phase of our Republic's brief, but eventful history.

3. Effective Maintenance of U.S.- ROK Security System: The defense of the ROK is based upon the maintenance of a scale of defense capability suitable to South Korea, the establishment of a posture capable of making good use of such defense, efforts to establish trust with the United States in upholding the security system, and finally, the establishment of a defense system capable of coping with and of deterring any aggression from the North.

Therefore, the U.S.- ROK security arrangements are essential to the security of South Korea, and friendly and cooperative relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea are vitally important not only in the field of defense, but also to the development and prosperity of Korea, and furthermore to a stable international political structure in Northeast Asia-West Pacific region. Continuous efforts by both Korea and the United States are necessary if the U.S.- ROK security arrangements are to

remain capable of smooth and effective implementation at any time.

In general, a treaty functions most effectively when the nations signatory to it receive mutual benefit. With regard to the U.S.- ROK Defense Treaty, mutual recognition of the treaty is of considerable benefit to both Korea and the United States, and cooperative relations between the two continue on the basis of such recognition. The United States attaches importance to the maintenance of friendly and cooperative relations with the ROK, a staunch ally, and a nation holding a principal position as a stabilizing force in East Asia.

General Wickham, Commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command and the U.S.- ROK Combined Forces Command in Korea, cites three reasons why peace and stability in the Korean peninsula are integral to U.S. national security:³

- (1) Geostrategic, at the confluence of U.S., Chinese, Russian, and Japanese interests in Northeast Asia;
- (2) Economic: the Republic of Korea is now America's twelfth biggest trading partner, headed for sixth or seventh in a few years (and, as Secretary Brown notes, U.S. trade with the East Asia region now is at a higher level than with Europe);
- (3) Moral, based on the 1954 mutual security treaty, and the U.S. physical presence demonstrates the national commitment to that treaty.

It is also necessary that Korea make efforts of its own, based on the important benefits the U.S.- ROK Defense Treaty affords the South Korean nation. South Koreans have continuously been open and forthcoming on U.S. base requirements in the South, for instance. In addition they participated in the Vietnam campaign alongside U.S. units, committing a 50,000-man force to the effort for several years. And, significantly, the ROK is now committing about \$2 billion of its resources to a combined defense improvement program, which directly and specifically benefits U.S. units or support elements. The following examples are good examples of

the sincere efforts of the ROK to support the U.S. forces
in Korea:

- (1) Assignment of KATUSA personnel to U.S. units: about 6,600 men. (KATUSA: Korean Augmentees to U.S. Army.)
- (2) Construction and maintenance of ammunition storage sites.
- (3) Local currency support for joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.
- (4) Extending petroleum pipeline north of Seoul to forward units.
- (5) Construction of 1,100 units of housing for U.S. military families.
- (6) Beddown facilities for A-10 aircraft.
- (7) Building POL and munition storage for USAF and USMC contingency stocks.
- (8) Allocation of port facilities, stevedores, and longstanding road and rail transport for wartime logistics movement.
- (9) Providing real estate for U.S. military use at no cost.
- (10) Dredging Pusan harbor to accept U.S. aircraft carriers.
- (11) Construction of Combined Field Army command and control center, and construction of combined Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Osan airbase.
- (12) Memorandum of Agreement for ROK government furnishing Korean flag shipping and Korean Airlines aircraft in a contingency. (This is still in negotiation, but its agreement is a matter of time.)⁴

South Korea has exhibited its deep concern over the defense posture by allocating six percent of its GNP towards military expenditure. This figure will no doubt be increased to seven percent in the near future. Young men in South Korea today can look towards thirty months of national service in the military. And a current assessment for impro-

ving the overall quality of the ROK military capability is underway. ROK industry also has made a commitment to this effort by revamping production schedules to include the hardware necessary for a strong viable national defense. Increased emphasis is now seen in the production of such equipment as M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns, mortars, howitzers (105mm, 155mm), ammunition, military transport vehicles (jeeps and trucks), radio equipment (portable and vehicular), improved M-48 tanks (M-48AK), naval craft and coproduction of fighter aircraft (F-5E).^{4a}

South Korea launched a prototype of a fast frigate -- Ulsan (울산함) class in the Spring of 1979, which was designed and built totally by the South Korean naval engineering team. With Korea's demonstrated capability for merchant ships, trawlers, mine warfare ships patrol craft and amphibious ships, the first ship of this Ulsan class is now under construction in the ROK naval shipyard, and is expected to be the proving ground for various combinations and permutations of propulsion, electronics and weaponry. Impressively, this ship (1,700-ton) is being propelled by a "German diesel engine, guided by British radars, armed with Italian guns, directed by a Dutch fire-control system." The expectation in naval quarters, however, is for the ultimate replacement of all the above foreign systems to be succeeded by South Korea's own domestically manufactured components.⁵

In aerial weapons from air-to-air missiles to aircraft, the progress is being implemented. Air Force Magazine in a recent issue succinctly described ROK's progress in the support of USAF forces in Korea and its aviation industry:⁶

One F-4D squadron of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (the 497th) is based at the ROKAF base at Taegu, with its aircraft maintained entirely by the ROKAF maintenance personnel at a very high in-commission rate. In addition, programmed depot maintenance of USAF F-4s from Pacific-wide is

now underway by Korean Air Lines technicians at Kimhae, supplanting the depot work formerly performed in Taiwan. At the same time, ROK aviation industry has geared up for F-5E coproduction and is already coproducing Hughes 500D helicopters under license. So the expectation is that within a few years, indigenous ROK aircraft can be expected as a global product of the capabilities already existing in the Republic.

South Korea has continued earnest efforts to develop its defense capability through successive Five-Year Armed Forces Improvement Plans (FIPs) in parallel to the national economic development plan. The F-16 sale recently reported in the mass media is part of the ROK FIP1982-86.⁷ Our Korean national defense policy is principally based on defensive posture in close cooperation with the United States, whose foreign policy is to secure peace by maintaining the status quo in the Korean peninsula.

For the improvement of the Korean armed forces included in the FIP1982-86, this writer fully subscribes to what General Wickham testified before the U.S. House Armed Forces Committee last February.⁸ His assessment and recommendations as regard the volatile situation in the Korean peninsula are as realistic as they are timely. They fit well into the strategic conception of the Reagan Administration that is resolved to deal strongly with any military threat overseas.

General Wickham urged the U.S. Congress to do three things:

- (1) provide U.S. foreign military sales credits at levels significantly higher than the \$160 million for FY 1981; (2) assist the ROK economy to ease the effects of necessary defense purchase; and (3) pass legislation providing for combined training, cross-servicing and mutual support similar to that contained in the NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979.⁹ Such legislation is expected to provide greater benefits in the way of arms sales credits to Korea, including an increase in amount. The question of waiving the royalties on sales of locally manufactured goods produced under license from abroad should also be settled in a way that would best serve the common interest of the United States and

and Korea. Under previous U.S. administrations the security of Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific had suffered setbacks on account of a growing trend toward disengagement and the secondary importance attached to this part of the world resulting from the traditional preoccupation with Europe. Reassuringly enough, however, the present Republican administration shows indications of reorientation in its foreign and military policies toward a more realistic and pragmatic course. General Wickham's appeal effectively underscores the relevance of this change for the better. Reinforcing the legislative backbone of the mutual alliance system of Korea and the United States to make it approximate the NATO arrangement will mark a significant step forward in our steady joint endeavour to boost the U.S.-ROK combined defense preparedness.

To this writer, the American public has little understanding of the military issue in the Korean peninsula, and vast exposure to Vietnam, Watergate, and "Koreagate" (Park Dong Sun incident) has made it all too prepared to inflict the backlash of its resentment on South Korea. Accordingly, the controversy on South Korea's "abuses" of human rights (from the American public point of view) and its effects within the U.S. may well curtail or prevent such U.S. aid unless the American Congress and public can be convinced that:

- (1) There are reasons why South Korean attitudes seem less serious when put in perspective;
- (2) There would be a serious imbalance in North and South Korean military capabilities if the U.S. weakened its deterrent presence without such aid;
- (3) The present military weakness of South Korea is at least somewhat the result of U.S. emphasis on economic development and weaknesses

in the past U.S. military assistance effort; and

(4) There are valid reasons why the U.S. has a vital strategic interest in South Korea which should be defended.

I have already cited reasons (by briefly quoting General Wickham in the previous page) why peace and stability in the Korean peninsula are integral to U.S. national security. With regard to rigidity of politics, there are at least some compensating reasons for South Koreans who have to cope with tense security situations. We constantly face a serious military threat from the North.

It is still vivid in our memory how the free Republic of Vietnam fell to the hands of Communists and how thousands of innocent people were massacred and persecuted solely because they wished to remain free and to continue to have their own mode of living and thinking. Freedom and peace once lost cannot be recovered easily. They must be defended and maintained at all cost. In this respect, the United States has at least some moral responsibility for South Korea's past emphasis on economic development and for a past U.S. military assistance effort that left South Korea inadequately postured for self-defense. We South Koreans are fully aware that there also are sound strategic reasons for the U.S. to ensure that South Korea can deter and defend by herself to a certain extent.

South Korea is the key to Japanese stability, and Japan and NATO are the critical allies the United States must have as part of its present national security structure. As long as South Korea is not threatened and the U.S. naval and air forces can support Japan, Japan will have no military reason to question its alliance with the U.S. or to hasten its rearmament. Further, the USSR will have no incentive to encourage North Korean military adventures, and there will be little possibility that

Red China might somehow be dragged into support of North Korean military action. The massive South Korean industrial capacity the U.S. has spent so much to create will not be at hazard, and there will be no risk of a united, strong, and hostile Korea. In short, by normal geopolitical criteria, the United States does have a permanent strategic interest in South Korea.

It is absolutely necessary Korean and American government officials concerned maintain continuous consultations on implementation of the security treaty and its related arrangements, and promote close communications between two sides. At the same time, it is essential that the Republic of Korea should make every effort to assure the United States armed forces in Korea of the stable use of facilities and areas which the ROK has the responsibility to provide under the security treaty. We South Koreans fully recognize the austere reality that our national security will have to be based on American protection.

4. U.S.- ROK Economic Cooperation: The United States and the Republic of Korea are bound by historic ties, forged in war and tempered in peace. Our two nations stand guard together in one of the most dangerous areas on the face of the globe. Together, we form the keystone of the free world's security system in Northeast Asia. In the past thirty years, this alliance has developed and matured into a strong and growing economic partnership. Korea is one of the major suppliers of the United States and one of America's best customers for U.S. exports. If we look into Korea's foreign trade, which corresponds to 69.2 percent of Korea's gross national product, we find that 26.3 percent of our exports were bound for the American market. Purchases from the United States amounted to \$4,800 million, or 19.8 percent of our total imports. These statistics serve as proof

that economic cooperation between our two countries is no less important than our security ties.¹⁰

The Korean people are now moving boldly toward a more prosperous and plural community, for which the continued growth of the Korean economy is essential. The vigor and the frontier spirit of Americans is owed to their founding forefathers, who set out with an indefatigable will to explore America in the early part of the 17th century. We Koreans sincerely respect the American aspiration for freedom and peace. We cannot but admire American capabilities and technology in the 20th century and the amazing results of the vast potential of mankind tapped by their pragmatism and free enterprise. Still vivid in the minds of the South Korean people is the record of American assistance to our national survival during the the devastating Korean War and the subsequent period of extreme privation. Together with American military aid in throwing back the North Korean invasion and in defending the ROK thereafter, American economic assistance not only helped rehabilitate the prostrate economy but also laid the foundations for later rapid growth. Looking back on our relations between two countries, they have not always been sweet and smooth. But this has been inevitable not because of our lack of cooperation but because of mainly cross-cultural barriers, which are minimizing year after year.

The period from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s was marked by accelerating Korean industrialization, leading to high economic growth rates. We regard this period as the first "take-off" for the Korean economy. Particularly noteworthy during this period, American economic assistance ceased to be oriented toward simple subsistence aid and our two countries started moving toward higher levels of economic cooperation in increasing diversity of fields. The United States began to provide us with

US-ROK
Two-Way Trade Figures*

(unit: million dollars)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>Exports</u>		<u>Imports</u>	
	<u>Total Export</u>	<u>Exports to U.S.</u>	<u>Total Imports</u>	<u>Imports from U.S.</u>
1970	835.2	395.2 (47.3%)	1,984.0	584.8 (29.5%)
1975	5,081.0	1,536.3 (30.2%)	7,274.4	1,881.1 (25.9%)
1977	10,046.5	3,118.7 (31.0%)	10,810.5	2,447.4 (22.6%)
1978	12,710.6	4,058.4 (31.9%)	14,971.6	3,043.0 (20.3%)
1979	15,055.5	4,373.9 (29.1%)	20,338.6	4,602.6 (22.6%)
1980	17,504.9	4,606.6 (26.3%)	22,292.0	4,890.0 (21.9%)

* Source: The Korea Herald (4 March 1981) quoted the ROK government data released by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

the necessary new technologies and managerial expertise on an expanded scale.

Korean-American cooperation during this period was more markedly geared to reciprocity. But it was still largely a relationship between a donor and a beneficiary. We are now entering a new stage of American-Korean economic cooperation. In this new phase, Korea and America are expected not only to continue their cooperation in fostering the progress of both countries, but also to work together to promote the growth and progress of the world economy as a whole.

Asia has now become the largest export market for the United States. In fact, Asia has begun to buy more from America than Europe does. Korea is the second largest Asian customer of U.S. products. In 1980 alone, South Korea purchased nearly \$5,000 million worth of American goods. Koreans heartily welcome an American business presence in Korea. We will encourage American businessmen even more positively than before to cooperate with their Korean counterparts and the Korean government in developing our Korean export products, in introducing advanced technology and in increasing American capital investments.

The surest way to liberate all mankind from poverty and to further global prosperity is by multilaterally increasing international cooperation to promote economic growth and trade everywhere. I would not subscribe to the view advocated by some one that growth "must be held back" in view of the earth's finite resources. It is not a dearth of resources that blocks improvements in the living standards of developing nations. The progress of developing countries has been impeded by inadequate cooperation between the developed "have nations" and the developing "have-not nations," because of the lack of a firm common conviction that developed and

developed nations should be partners in seeking coexistence and mutual prosperity (in many instances there are such self-imposed limits to growth).

Efforts by developing countries to industrialize and expand their trade should not be regarded as challenges to the industrialized nations. Rather, the current limits on growth can be overcome by mutually opening domestic markets to expand international trade, because expanding trade will provide a strong impetus to global economic growth and the development of non-utilized or under-utilized resources in developing nations. America and Korea should make even greater efforts to take advantage of the merits of free enterprise systems, while offsetting the weaknesses of free enterprise systems, if there are any, so that they can make even greater contributions to world economic and trade growth.

5. Refitting of JAPAN-ROK Economic Ties: Economic and trade ties between South Korea and Japan are very important to both parties. Both sides should be encouraged to help each other to explore wide avenues of economic and trade potentials between the two countries. One significant development in the trade ties between the ROK and Japan is that Korea's trade balance is worsening despite ongoing efforts to rectify the trade imbalance through the diversification of import markets. South Korea's machinery industry structure, which leads Korea to depend heavily on the imports from Japan, is cited as the most formidable stumbling block in Korea's efforts to rectify its trade imbalance with Japan.

Since the development stages of Korea and Japan are different, Korea has to depend on Japan for sophisticated equipment to expedite its industrialization. Japan should attempt to correct the trade imbalance running in heavy disfavor of Korea. Considering that Japan is the largest material and equipment supplier to South Korea because of its location and

dexterous sales promotion drive, the rapid improvement in the chronic trade imbalance will contribute to the promotion of Japanese business interests.

Korea has been suffering from the snowbaling deficit in its trade with Japan which now totals nearly \$20,000 million.¹¹ On the other hand, Japan has seemingly made a point of its role in extending credits or capital cooperation to the South Korean economy. But Japan's trade surplus with Korea averages at \$1,200 million a year. Promotion of economic cooperation between two countries has recently been an objective of considerable concern in both parties. This is encouraging because actual cooperation between the two neighbors has been far less than needed for quite some time. But this is also encouraging in that the current concern presages a new momentum for refitting the overall relationship between Seoul and Tokyo which has been rather strained in recent years, notably over the case of Kim Dae Jung.¹² But both sides should help each other in invigorating their cooperative ties.

A positive move in this direction was the inauguration of the Korea-Japan Economic Association in Seoul last January. Consisting of a large number of business leaders, the association is expected to play a major role in accelerating economic cooperation between two countries on a private level. It is to be noted that the birth of the association coincided with a renewal of interest by Japanese businesses in investment in Korea. This may be an offshoot of the negligible returns of their ambitious onrush toward Red China which has proved after all not ready yet to absorb as much foreign capital and technology as assumed by Japan and other Western nations.

The situation has little improved despite repeated pledges of efforts between two countries. Japan's barriers still remain high and thick against imports from South Korea ranging from agricultural and marine products to

such manufactured goods as textiles. Of course, the ROK has to revise its own trade pattern and competitive edge to cope with such import barriers. But an outstanding truth is that the interdependence of the economies of the two neighbor countries is great and growing greater. A prosperous Korean economy will be conducive to increasing the economic benefit of Japan, not to speak of its geopolitical stability as a whole. The new association of Korean business leaders may do well to begin with a joint search with their Japanese counterparts for ways to make their cooperation most complementary to the two interdependent economies.

Such economic cooperation, needless to say, cannot be expected outside an overall cooperative relationship between the two governments. The inauguration of a new government of the Fifth Republic this spring will be a moment for Korea and its international partners to renew and reinforce their friendly ties. As Tokyo also seems eager to take this moment to reshape its relations with the ROK, the two countries will be able to augment their neighborly ties on the basis of interdependence and reciprocal partnership.

6. Japan's Contribution to the Regional Security: The vulnerability of the Japanese armed forces was demonstrated in 1976 when Soviet defector Lieutenant Viktor Belenko eluded radar and landed, undetected, his MiG-25 at a small airstrip in northern Japan. As Tokyo has not provided adequately for its own defense since the end of World War II, the Japanese government (particularly the last two governments) has been under mounting pressure from Washington to contribute more to their own defense.

But the 7.6 percent hike now planned for Japan's 1981 defense budget will almost certainly keep that country's total military spending below one percent of its GNP, the smallest comparative effort of any industria-

lized country.¹³ Japan's defense budget is now 0.9 percent of GNP, compared with France (3.3), West Germany (3.4), Britain (4.7), and the United States (5.0). That translates into a per capita defense expenditure in Japan of \$87, compared with France (\$349), West Germany (\$396), Britain (\$312), and the United States (\$520).¹⁴

Japan seems fully committed to a gradual buildup of its very modest air, land, and sea forces. And it is also true that any increase in spending for weaponry remains controversial in a country still traumatized by the devastation it suffered in World War II. And yet, both the Japanese government and, increasingly, the people of Japan, recognize that the Soviet Union's growing power in the Far East coupled with a sharp decline in American military strength in the Western Pacific is leaving Japan even more vulnerable. What worries more is the shift in military balance caused by the massive arms buildup of the Soviet Union; Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Indochina, and Africa; establishment of military bases on the islands off Hokkaido that Japan claims as its territory; and enlargement of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

At present, Japanese forces could not begin to defend the sea lanes upon which Japan depends for daily imports of oil, foodstuffs, and natural resources. Japan's air defense forces are rudimentary. And the Japanese army fields an almost token force of 155,000 troops.¹⁵ A defense budget that grows at less than eight percent per year would not fund forces adequate for Japan's security needs until the 1990s, if then. So, the pressure from Washington and from their other allied capitals must continue. The Japanese must come to understand that the United States cannot rebuild its strategic nuclear forces, defend the Persian Gulf, counter Soviet might in Europe, and maintain its other defense commitments from South Korea to the

Caribbean while simultaneously shielding Japan from the harsh realities of the 1980s.

Since the end of World War II, particularly since the mid-1960s when Japan was known to catch up with industrialized countries, surpassing France, Britain and many other European countries in terms of economic power, the Japanese have been accused of saving billions of dollars by cultivating their reluctance to rearm. The Detroit News, dated 12 January 1981, quoted a recent article from the newspaper Asahi Shimbun written by Hosai Hyuga, board chairman of Sumitomo Metals Industries Inc., calling for an end to what he called Tokyo's "free ride."¹⁶

Japan should raise defense spending to 1.9 percent of GNP -- to at least match the defense commitment of neutral Switzerland...Japan can spend 1.9 percent of GNP on defensive arms alone, without acquiring any offensive capability. Japan must have at least sufficient military strength to hold out if attacked until help comes from America under the American-Japanese defense treaty...America suffered a "relative decline" and can no longer afford to defend the Western world without help.

The disappointment expressed by the Carter Administration over a less-than-expected increase in Japan's defense budget can hardly have come as a surprise in Tokyo. Even the Reagan Administration can not hope to meet such global commitment without help from friends, especially those possessing more than enough wealth to provide for their own protection. U.S. weakness is not the main reason Japan should pay for more of its own defense.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The objectives and aims of this report are designed to lead to a clear-cut understanding of Korea and its present sense of division, which is distinctly the DPRK in the north and the ROK in the south. This division was caused by neither civil war nor civil strife. It was the result of an artificial partition created by the interests of the neighboring major powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China. The reality of this situation requires acceptance of this partition as de facto and an understanding of how it relates to conditions in Korean society today.

The ultimate aim of the Korean people is unification of the peninsula, and a resolution of the issues which contribute to its current division. The status quo which now exists in Korea appears to be a predicament Koreans will have to cope with until destiny or the major powers which decreed the division provide the necessary framework for unification. If we rely on destiny, Korea must take a part in shaping that destiny. The ROK, therefore, is required to assume the position of a truly independent nation-state and flourish as a dignified member of the international community. This is a task which cannot be assumed by a few individuals, a specific group, or segment of society. Its success, however, can be certified by the participation of all its citizens.

The past experience of Korea will serve as a case study for the future. While independent diplomacy and self-reliance would be her greatest assets, the independence must be backed at least presently by an understanding partner, due to the conditions that have been described in the

foregoing text. As Koreans we must create a stable environment which stresses social, economic and political equilibrium. This must be done step by step in a profound and orderly manner. Interwoven in these concerns is the eventual establishment of a welfare society with emphasis on social order to maintain social justice. To this end we are supporting the mandate of human rights as it applies to us, in a sincere effort to eliminate class division and enable all Koreans to reach their full potential.

Sustained focus on our security measures is of the utmost importance in creating an atmosphere that will be viable to policies which will meet the goals of the welfare society we hope to realize.

The North Korean Communist regime has not yet given up its dream (nightmare) of unifying Korea by force. But such a unification formula, which would only mean national self-destruction, must be firmly rejected in the name of the Korean people. Thus it is important that all Koreans who favor peaceful unification be united as one.

The outlook for the rest of this decade, during which Korea has to make a historic step forward toward the constitution of an affluent but healthy society, is still faced with challenges due to changes and upheavals throughout the world, including continued and renewed tensions between the major powers. In this period, one of our major problems is functioning effectively to eliminate or at least minimize various side-effects generated by the early stages of national modernization and industrialization dating from the 1970s, which eventually resulted in the assassination of the late President Park.

The common interest of the four major powers in the Korean peninsula is to keep stability by maintaining status quo. Therefore, unless the conflicting issues between these powers reach an agreement on unifi-

cation, it is the "impossible dream" of the Korean people. In order to survive in the struggle between these four major powers, Korea needs to concur on alignment with them. Yet amid the spectrum of international politics, it is an impractical solution at present due to ideological differences within the governmental structure of the countries involved. This leads South Korea to a choice of military alliance with the United States and economic ties with Japan. South Koreans will have to step up their efforts to promote closer relations -- economic, military and political -- with these two powers under the principle of mutual understanding and mutual respect for sovereignty. Since Korean security is vital to Japan, the Japanese government must recognize the necessity of its increased contribution to the security of the region under the leadership of the United States, which is the only country to cope with the Soviet Union in terms of strategic nuclear capability.

Albeit we are keenly aware that we Koreans alone are ultimately responsible for the nation's survival and happiness, we feel a debt towards our allies led by the United States -- a debt that can be repaid in time. Our present capacity is limited because of our historical and cultural background; however, being given the sufficient time, we will prove our potential capability to enhance America's position in Northeast Asia. Koreans must cultivate all the advantages of working both independently and dependently with such directly concerned major powers as the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China. The result of this approach would perhaps create a scenario of political and economic progress toward our ultimate goal of peaceful unification.

Time will be the measure of success in establishing a firm foundation for the framework of unification. The decisions we make today,

as individuals, groups or government, can either divert us from or
channel us towards achieving and maintaining our own destiny.

(24 APRIL 1981)

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1. Foreign Relations of the U.S. Diplomatic Papers (The Conference at Cairo 1943), Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, p.449.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. Quoted from: A Handbook of Korea, Seoul Korea, Ministry of Culture and Information, ROK Government Printing Office, 1979, p.463.
2. Statistics shown in the following discussion of the Economic Development section are based on Ibid., pp.765-794.
3. South Korea successfully overcame the recent political and economic crisis caused by the assassination of the former President Park Chung Hee in October 1979.
4. As of the end of 1980, there are 33 branches of 30 foreign banks from ten foreign countries: US (13), UK, France and Japan (4 branches each), Canada and Middle East (2 each) and others (4). See Securities Trading To Be OKd for Aliens," The Korea Herald, January 15, 1981, p.5.
5. Ron Richardson, "Seoul's businessmen get a break," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 28, 1980, pp. 48-49.
6. The source of the information was reported as a direct quote by: "Restructuring Will Succeed: Business Week Optimistic On ROK Economic Groth," The Korea Herald, 13 January 1981, p. 3.
7. Ibid.
8. "ROK GNP Growth For '81 Seen 5-6%," The Korea Herald, 25 February 1981, p. 3.
9. "Ship Orders From Abroad To Hit \$2 Bil.," The Korea Herald, 25 February 1981, p. 3.
10. "General Wickham's Testimony Before The U.S. House," Dong-Ah Il-Bo (East Asia Daily), 24 February 1981, p. 3, and for the further details, see U.S. Legislative Digest, Vol. 127, No. 27, February 20, 1981, p.3.
11. Ibid. (Dong-Ah Il-Bo.)
12. All statistics shown on these issues in the "Social Development section are based on A Handbook of Korea, Seoul, ROK Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 717-734.
13. Kahn, Herman, World Economic Development, 1979 and Beyond, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1979, p. 358.
14. Kim, Kwang-Bong, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971, p. 6.
15. Ibid., p. 9.

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16. Ibid., p.11.

17. Meade, E. Grant, American Military Government in Korea, New York, King's Crown Press, 1951, p.48.

18. Presidents Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and Park Chung Hee (1961-1979).

19. This is the categorization based on the amendment of the Constitution, upon which each Republic was born.

20. SCNSM was reorganized into the Legislative Council for National Security which took over the functions of the disbanded National Assembly. SCNSM was deactivated after the new congressional election was conducted last March.

21. Under the new Constitution, general elections were conducted for the new President and new Congressmen last February and March respectively. The new Constitution allows a seven-year single term presidency to enable the future President to institute stable policies and to preclude past mistakes coming from the stagnation of power. The term for new Congressmen will be four years in contrast to six years in the previous Constitution.

22. "US Commitment to Human Rights," Current Policy No. 198, 13 June 1980, p.2.

23. Ibid., p.3.

24. "The Reagan Administration and the Human Rights," The Korea Herald, 15 February 1981, p.3. Mr. Lefever is a prolific writer and president of the Ethics and Policy Center in Washington. See "South Korean Leader Spares Rivel's Life," The Montgomery Advertiser and Alabama Journal, 24 January 1981, p. 25.

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1. White, Nathan N., U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations, Colorado, Westview Press, 1979, pp.224-227.
2. Ibid.
3. Don Oberdorfer, "Haig Opposes Further Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From South Korea," Washington Post, January 13, 1981, p.4. For a detailed information, see "Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr.," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 97th Session on The Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., To Be Secretary of State, January 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 1981, pp.201-202.
4. Min, Byong-Chun, "Han-Kuk Ahn-Bo Ron" (韩国安保论 · The Security of South Korea), Seoul, Dae-Wang Printing Co., 1978, p.53.
5. Kim, Young-Ju, "The Significance of the Three-Way Talks," Kong-San Kwon Mun-Jae (共産圏問題 · Problems of Communist Areas), Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1979, p.57.
6. Ibid., p.53.
7. McCormack, Cavan, Korea: North and South, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1978, p.164.
8. Weinstein, Franklin B., & Kamiya, Fuji, The Security of Korea: U.S. and Japanese Perspectives on the 1980s, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980, p.46.
9. Schlesinger, Arthur M., The Dynamics of World Power, (A Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1973), New York, Chelsea House publishers, 1973, p.775.
10. Kim, Young-Ju, "The Significance of the Three-Way Talks," Kong-San Kwon Mun-Jae (Problems of Communist Areas), Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1979, p.62.
11. This quote resulted from the writer's previous paper ("The Significance of the Korean Peninsula", written in 1974 at RAF Staff College). The source is unobtainable at present and the quote will have to be maintained under the integrity of this writer.
12. The idea of cross-recognition is the simultaneous extension of diplomatic recognition by the United States and Japan to North Korea and by the Soviet Union and Red China to South Korea.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. "Stop Reckless Slandering," Editorial, The Kyung-Hyang Daily News, October 15, 1978, p.2.
2. U.S. Military Posture For FY 1981, An Overview By General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, p. 3.
3. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report For Fiscal Year 1982, January 19, 1981, p.84 and p.87.
4. This is not officially confirmed. It is based on the personal verbal conversation between the writer and a ranking official in charge at the ROK National Defense Industry Corporation.
5. White, Nathan N., U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations, Colorado, Westview Press, 1979, p.131.
6. Bridget Gail, "The Korean Balance vs. The U.S. Withdrawal," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1978, pp.40-41.
7. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1980-1981, pp.70-71.
8. Ibid.
9. Min, Byong-Chon, The Security of the Republic of Korea (韩国安保论), Seoul, Dae-Wang Printing Co., 1978, p.294.
10. Ibid., p.296.
11. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1980-1981, p.71.
12. Ibid.
13. Canby, Steven L., & Luttwak, Edward N., The Control of Arms Transfers and Perceived Security Needs, Maryland, C & L Associates (Defense Consultants), 1980, p.18.
14. South Korea's request to buy 36 F-16s has recently been approved by the Reagan administration. See "U.S. Has Agreed To Sell F-16s To South Korea," Washington Post, 4 February 1981, p.18.
15. Later this year the U.S. Air Force will begin assigning the F-16 to the USAF units in South Korea to replace the F-4. Ibid.
16. White, Nathan N., U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations, Colorado, Westview Press, 1979, p.116.
17. Ibid., p.119.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

1. "Chun Invites Kim Il-Sung: No Preconditions," The Korea Herald, January 13, 1981, p.1.
2. Ibid.
3. F. Clifton Berry, Jr., "Northeast Asia: The Shifting Balance," AIR FORCE Magazine, June 1980, p.41.
4. Ibid. 4a. Ibid.
5. Variety of technological know-how is inevitable because of limited access to American technology due to the U.S. Congressional process. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. "US Has Agreed to Sell F-16s to South Korea," Washington Post, 4 February 1981, p.18, and "To Sell 36 F-16s to South Korea: \$900 million...Package," Defense Week, 30 March 1980, p.7.
8. U.S. Legislative Digest, Vol. 127, No. 27, p.3 (February 20, 1981).
9. Ibid.
10. Statistics shown here are quoted by The Korea Herald, 1 February 1981, an English daily in Seoul, based on the KBS-TV interview with Lee Sung-Yun, Minister of Finance, which was conducted on the 30th of January 1981.
11. In 1979 alone, Korea's trade deficit with Japan stood at \$3,303,671,000. "Korea's Export-Import Volumes with Japan," The Korea Herald, 13 February 1981, p. 3.
12. Kim Dae Jung is a South Korean opposition political leader who ran for office against President Park in 1971. Upon failure to secure the office, he left Korea and conducted anti-government activities both in America and Japan. In 1973 he was returned forcefully from Tokyo to Seoul, where he was placed under house surveillance. Following the assassination of President Park, he was released and resumed his political activities, which led to another accusation of being a prime mover to overthrow the government by violence (Kwangju incident), for which he was again tried and sentenced to death. Japan has backed up its demands on South Korea to spare his life with some formidable sanctions, including a series of postponement of an important ministerial conference. The U.S. is also said to have demanded clemency for Kim. President Chun, prior to his visit with President Reagan last February, has granted clemency to Kim and has reduced his sentence to life imprisonment.
13. "Japan Must Do More," San Diego Union, 3 January 1981, p. 25.
14. "Defending Japan," Detroit News, 12 January 1981, p. 25.

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15. IISS, Military Balance 1980-81, p. 69.
16. "Defending Japan," Detroit News, 12 January 1981, p. 25.

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